相关论文: On the parameterized complexity of manipulating To…

In this work we study the optimal execution problem with multiplicative price impact in algorithm trading, when an agent holds an initial position of shares of a financial asset. The inter-selling-decision times are modelled by the arrival…

We consider the problem of allocating heterogeneous and indivisible goods among strategic agents, with preferences over subsets of goods, when there is no medium of exchange. This model captures the well studied problem of fair allocation…

The problem of fair division of indivisible goods is a fundamental problem of social choice. Recently, the problem was extended to the case when goods form a graph and the goal is to allocate goods to agents so that each agent's bundle…

In the problem of fully allocating a social endowment of perfectly divisible commodities among a group of agents with multidimensional single-peaked preferences, we study strategy-proof rules that are not Pareto-dominated by other…

Atomic congestion games are a classic topic in network design, routing, and algorithmic game theory, and are capable of modeling congestion and flow optimization tasks in various application areas. While both the price of anarchy for such…

Scheduling theory is an old and well-established area in combinatorial optimization, whereas the much younger area of parameterized complexity has only recently gained the attention of the community. Our aim is to bring these two areas…

Schulze and ranked-pairs elections have received much attention recently, and the former has quickly become a quite widely used election system. For many cases these systems have been proven resistant to bribery, control, or manipulation,…

This paper studies the unification problem with associative, commutative, and associative-commutative functions mainly from a viewpoint of the parameterized complexity on the number of variables. It is shown that both associative and…

We consider two matrix completion problems, in which we are given a matrix with missing entries and the task is to complete the matrix in a way that (1) minimizes the rank, or (2) minimizes the number of distinct rows. We study the…

When allocating indivisible items to agents, it is known that the only strategyproof mechanisms that satisfy a set of rather mild conditions are constrained serial dictatorships: given a fixed order over agents, at each step the designated…

We explore the clearing problem in the barter exchange market. The problem, described in the terminology of graph theory, is to find a set of vertex-disjoint, length-restricted cycles that maximize the total weight in a weighted digraph.…

We consider the following control problem on fair allocation of indivisible goods. Given a set $I$ of items and a set of agents, each having strict linear preference over the items, we ask for a minimum subset of the items whose deletion…

We study various novel complexity measures for two-sided matching mechanisms, applied to the two canonical strategyproof matching mechanisms, Deferred Acceptance (DA) and Top Trading Cycles (TTC). Our metrics are designed to capture the…

Randomized mechanisms, which map a set of bids to a probability distribution over outcomes rather than a single outcome, are an important but ill-understood area of computational mechanism design. We investigate the role of randomized…

We study the problem of allocating indivisible items to agents with additive valuations, under the additional constraint that bundles must be connected in an underlying item graph. Previous work has considered the existence and complexity…

In the problem of allocating a single non-disposable commodity among agents whose preferences are single-peaked, we study a weakening of strategy-proofness called not obvious manipulability (NOM). If agents are cognitively limited, then NOM…

We study the computational complexity of finding fair allocations of indivisible goods in the setting where a social network on the agents is given. Notions of fairness in this context are "localized", that is, agents are only concerned…

We propose models for lobbying in a probabilistic environment, in which an actor (called "The Lobby") seeks to influence voters' preferences of voting for or against multiple issues when the voters' preferences are represented in terms of…

Using theory and experiments, this paper shows that the difficulty of making tradeoffs offers a parsimonious explanation for a wide range of behavioral phenomena. We develop a model of imprecise comparisons applicable to multiattribute,…

The network pricing problem (NPP) is a bilevel problem, where the leader optimizes its revenue by deciding on the prices of certain arcs in a graph, while expecting the followers (also known as the commodities) to choose a shortest path…