相关论文: The Power Allocation Game on A Network: A Paradox

We study the system-level effects of the introduction of large populations of Electric Vehicles on the power and transportation networks. We assume that each EV owner solves a decision problem to pick a cost-minimizing charge and travel…

In competitive resource allocation formulations multiple agents compete over different contests by committing their limited resources in them. For these settings, contest games offer a game-theoretic foundation to analyze how players can…

Braess \cite{1} has been studied about a traffic flow on a diamond type network and found that introducing new edges to the networks always does not achieve the efficiency. Some researchers studied the Braess' paradox in similar type…

It is known that autonomous cars can increase road capacities by maintaining a smaller headway through vehicle platooning. Recent works have shown that these capacity increases can influence vehicles' route choices in unexpected ways…

We study bottleneck routing games where the social cost is determined by the worst congestion on any edge in the network. Bottleneck games have been studied in the literature by having the player's utility costs to be determined by the…

By introducing a simple model based on two-dimensional cellular automata, we reveal the relationship between the routing strategies of individual vehicles and the global behavior of transportation networks. Specifically, we characterize the…

We consider a sharing economy network where agents embedded in a graph share their resources. This is a fundamental model that abstracts numerous emerging applications of collaborative consumption systems. The agents generate a random…

We study a routing game in an environment with multiple heterogeneous information systems and an uncertain state that affects edge costs of a congested network. Each information system sends a noisy signal about the state to its subscribed…

We consider the interaction among agents engaging in a driving task and we model it as general-sum game. This class of games exhibits a plurality of different equilibria posing the issue of equilibrium selection. While selecting the most…

We study a pricing game in multi-hop relay networks where nodes price their services and route their traffic selfishly and strategically. In this game, each node (1) announces pricing functions which specify the payments it demands from its…

Congestion games are popular models often used to study the system-level inefficiencies caused by selfish agents, typically measured by the price of anarchy. One may expect that aligning the agents' preferences with the system-level…

We find a simple, partially altruistic mechanism that can increase global gain for a community of selfish agents. The mechanism is implied in the phenomena found in the minority game. We apply the mechanism to a two-road traffic system to…

Organizations consist of individuals connected by their responsibilities, incentives, and reporting structure. These connections are aptly represented by a network, hierarchical or other, which is often used to divide tasks. A primary goal…

The Parrondo's paradox is a counterintuitive phenomenon in which individually losing strategies, canonically termed game A and game B, are combined to produce winning outcomes. In this paper, a co-evolution of game dynamics and network…

We study an information design problem in transportation networks, in the presence of a random state that affects the travel times on the links. An omniscient system planner -- aiming at reducing congestion -- observes the network state…

Resources are often limited, therefore it is essential how convincingly competitors present their claims for them. Beside a player's natural capacity, here overconfidence and bluffing may also play a decisive role and influence how to share…

Coordination is a desirable feature in many multi-agent systems such as robotic and socioeconomic networks. We consider a task allocation problem as a binary networked coordination game over an undirected regular graph. Each agent in the…

In congestion games, users make myopic routing decisions to jam each other, and the social planner with the full information designs mechanisms on information or payment side to regulate. However, it is difficult to obtain time-varying…

Multilayer networks describe well many real interconnected communication and transportation systems, ranging from computer networks to multimodal mobility infrastructures. Here, we introduce a model in which the nodes have a limited…

We consider the problem of designing the the utility functions of the utility-maximizing agents in a multi-agent system so that they work synergistically to maximize a global utility. The particular problem domain we explore is the control…