相关论文: Burning the Trojan Horse: Defending against Side-C…
Security analyses of quantum cryptographic protocols typically rely on certain conditions; one such condition is that the sender (Alice) and receiver (Bob) have isolated devices inaccessible to third parties. If an eavesdropper (Eve) has a…
An eavesdropper Eve may probe a quantum key distribution (QKD) system by sending a bright pulse from the quantum channel into the system and analyzing the back-reflected pulses. Such Trojan-horse attacks can breach the security of the QKD…
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) leverages the principles of quantum mechanics to provide theoretically unconditional security for cryptographic key sharing. However, practical implementations remain vulnerable due to non-ideal devices and…
A quantum key distribution system may be probed by an eavesdropper Eve by sending in bright light from the quantum channel and analyzing the back-reflections. We propose and experimentally demonstrate a setup for mounting such a…
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) leverages the principles of quantum mechanics to exchange a secret key between two parties. Unlike classical cryptographic systems, the security of QKD is not reliant on computational assumptions but is…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides information-theoretic security grounded in the fundamental laws of physics. Nevertheless, practical imperfections can introduce side channels that expose QKD systems to quantum hacking, especially…
Most security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) disregard the effect of information leakage from the users' devices, and, thus, do not protect against Trojan-horse attacks (THAs). In a THA, the eavesdropper injects strong light into…
An elementary derivation of best eavesdropping strategies for the 4 state BB84 quantum cryptography protocol is presented, for both incoherent and two--qubit coherent attacks. While coherent attacks do not help Eve to obtain more…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a cryptographic technique that leverages principles of quantum mechanics to offer extremely high levels of data security during transmission. It is well acknowledged for its capacity to accomplish provable…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides a theoretically secure method for cryptographic key exchange by leveraging quantum mechanics, but practical implementations face vulnerabilities such as Trojan horse attack on phase modulators. This…
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) protocol has been demonstrated as a viable solution to detector side-channel attacks. One of the main advantages of MDI-QKD is that the security can be proved without making…
The security proofs of the Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols make certain assumptions about the operations of physical systems. Thus, appropriate modelling of devices to ensure that their operations are consistent with the models…
High-speed quantum key distribution (QKD) systems have achieved repetition frequencies above gigahertz through advanced technologies and devices, laying an important foundation for the deployment of high-key-rate QKD system. Although these…
Quantum cryptographic protocols are typically analysed by assuming that potential opponents can carry out all physical operations, an assumption which grants capabilities far in excess of present technology. Adjusting this assumption to…
Twin-field quantum key distribution (TF-QKD) and its variants can overcome the fundamental rate-distance limit of QKD which has been demonstrated in the laboratory and field while their physical implementations with side channels remains to…
In semiquantum key-distribution (Boyer et al.) Alice has the same capability as in BB84 protocol, but Bob can measure and prepare qubits only in $\{|0\rangle, |1\rangle\}$ basis and reflect any other qubit. We study an eavesdropping…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) systems can send signals over more than 100 km standard optical fiber and are widely believed to be secure. Here, we show experimentally for the first time a technologically feasible attack, namely the…
Inserting nonreciprocal devices at the doorways of Alice and Bob is a widely recognized countermeasure against quantum hacking attacks in quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. However, traditional integrated nonreciprocal devices, which…
In a two-way deterministic quantum key distribution (DQKD) protocol, Bob randomly prepares qubits in one of four states and sends them to Alice. To encode a bit, Alice performs an operation on each received qubit and returns it to Bob. Bob…
Practical implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD) have been shown to be subject to various detector side-channel attacks that compromise the promised unconditional security. Most notable is a general class of attacks adopting the…