The security proofs of the Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols make certain assumptions about the operations of physical systems. Thus, appropriate modelling of devices to ensure that their operations are consistent with the models assumed in the security proof is imperative. In this paper, we explore the Trojan horse attack (THA) using Measurement Device Independent (MDI) QKD integrated photonic chips and how to avoid some of the security vulnerabilities using only on-chip components. We show that a monitor photodiode paired appropriately with enough optical isolation, given the sensitivity of the photodiode, can detect high power sniffing attacks. We also show that the placement of amplitude modulators with respect to back reflecting components and their switching time can be used to thwart a THA.
@article{arxiv.2408.16835,
title = {Physical Security of Chip-Based Quantum Key Distribution Devices},
author = {Friederike Jöhlinger and Henry Semenenko and Philip Sibson and Djeylan Aktas and John Rarity and Chris Erven and Siddarth Joshi and Imad Faruque},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2408.16835},
year = {2024}
}