相关论文: Truthful Bilateral Trade is Impossible even with F…

We study the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating a set of items among strategic agents with additive valuations, where items are either all indivisible or all divisible. When items are goods, numerous positive and negative results…

Posted price mechanisms are prevalent in allocating goods within online marketplaces due to their simplicity and practical efficiency. We explore a fundamental scenario where buyers' valuations are independent and identically distributed,…

We introduce one-way games, a framework motivated by applications in large-scale power restoration, humanitarian logistics, and integrated supply-chains. The distinguishable feature of the games is that the payoff of some player is…

We study mechanism design when agents may have hidden secondary goals which will manifest as non-trivial preferences among outcomes for which their primary utility is the same. We show that in such cases, a mechanism is robust against…

Small operators who take part in secondary wireless spectrum markets typically have strict budget limits. In this paper, we study the bidding problem of a budget constrained operator in repeated secondary spectrum auctions. In existing…

We revisit the problem of designing the profit-maximizing single-item auction, solved by Myerson in his seminal paper for the case in which bidder valuations are independently distributed. We focus on general joint distributions, seeking…

We study multi-agent contract design with combinatorial actions, under budget constraints, and for a broad class of objective functions, including profit (principal's utility), reward, and welfare. Our first result is a strong…

How does one allocate a collection of resources to a set of strategic agents in a fair and efficient manner without using money? For in many scenarios it is not feasible to use money to compensate agents for otherwise unsatisfactory…

We study revenue maximization when a seller offers $k$ identical units to ex ante heterogeneous, unit-demand buyers. While anonymous pricing can be $\Theta(\log k)$ worse than optimal in general multi-unit environments, we show that this…

Our aim is to design mechanisms that motivate all agents to reveal their predictions truthfully and promptly. For myopic agents, proper scoring rules induce truthfulness. However, as has been described in the literature, when agents take…

We study the problem of fairly and truthfully allocating $m$ indivisible items to $n$ agents with additive preferences. Specifically, we consider truthful mechanisms outputting allocations that satisfy EF$^{+u}_{-v}$, where, in an…

We study balanced exchange problems in which agents with responsive preferences are endowed with multiple indivisible objects and can trade without transfers (e.g. shift exchange, time-banking). Eliciting full preferences over bundles is…

We study revenue maximization through sequential posted-price (SPP) mechanisms in single-dimensional settings with $n$ buyers and independent but not necessarily identical value distributions. We construct the SPP mechanisms by considering…

We study one-sided matchings with endowments in the absence of money. It is well-known that a competitive equilibrium may not always exist and that the strong core may be empty in this setting [Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979]. We propose a…

With the rapidly growing demand for the cloud services, a need for efficient methods to trade computing resources increases. Commonly used fixed-price model is not always the best approach for trading cloud resources, because of its…

We study the communication complexity of combinatorial auctions via interpolation mechanisms that interpolate between non-truthful and truthful protocols. Specifically, an interpolation mechanism has two phases. In the first phase, the…

In this work we consider selling items using a sequential first price auction mechanism. We generalize the assumption of conservative bidding to extensive form games (henceforth optimistic conservative bidding), and show that for both…

In this paper, we study sequential auctions with two budget constrained bidders and any number of identical items. All prior results on such auctions consider only two items. We construct a canonical outcome of the auction that is the only…

Consider a barter exchange problem over a finite set of agents, where each agent owns an item and is also associated with a (privately known) wish list of items belonging to the other agents. An outcome of the problem is a (re)allocation of…

Designing revenue optimal auctions for selling an item to $n$ symmetric bidders is a fundamental problem in mechanism design. Myerson (1981) shows that the second price auction with an appropriate reserve price is optimal when bidders'…