相关论文: On Strong Equilibria and Improvement Dynamics in N…

We investigate the behavior of a large number of selfish users that are able to switch dynamically between multiple wireless access-points (possibly belonging to different standards) by introducing an iterated non-cooperative game. Users…

Much work has been done on the computation of market equilibria. However due to strategic play by buyers, it is not clear whether these are actually observed in the market. Motivated by the observation that a buyer may derive a better…

We consider a discrete-time nonatomic routing game with variable demand and uncertain costs. Given a routing network with single origin and destination, the cost function of each edge depends on some uncertain persistent state parameter. At…

We consider a stochastic tournament game in which each player is rewarded based on her rank in terms of the completion time of her own task and is subject to cost of effort. When players are homogeneous and the rewards are purely rank…

We study non-atomic congestion games on parallel-link networks with affine cost functions. We investigate the power of machine-learned predictions in the design of coordination mechanisms aimed at minimizing the impact of selfishness. Our…

Most products are produced and sold by supply chain networks, where an interconnected network of producers and intermediaries set prices to maximize their profits. I show that there exists a unique equilibrium in a price-setting game on a…

Nash equilibrium is often heralded as a guiding principle for rational decision-making in strategic interactions. However, it is well-known that Nash equilibrium sometimes fails as a reliable predictor of outcomes, with two of the most…

Motivated by understanding non-strict and strict pure strategy equilibria in network anti-coordination games, we define notions of stable and, respectively, strictly stable colorings in graphs. We characterize the cases when such colorings…

The decisions that human beings make to allocate time has significant bearing on economic output and to the sustenance of social networks. The time allocation problem motivates our formal analysis of the resource allocation game, where…

We consider a class of jump games in which agents of different types occupy the nodes of a graph aiming to maximize the variety of types in their neighborhood. In particular, each agent derives a utility equal to the number of types…

We study a pricing game in multi-hop relay networks where nodes price their services and route their traffic selfishly and strategically. In this game, each node (1) announces pricing functions which specify the payments it demands from its…

We investigate complexity issues related to pure Nash equilibria of strategic games. We show that, even in very restrictive settings, determining whether a game has a pure Nash Equilibrium is NP-hard, while deciding whether a game has a…

The emergence of complex networks from evolutionary games is studied occurring when agents are allowed to switch interaction partners. For this purpose a coevolutionary iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game is defined on a random network with…

Recently, strategic games inspired by Schelling's influential model of residential segregation have been studied in the TCS and AI literature. In these games, agents of k different types occupy the nodes of a network topology aiming to…

Many models from a variety of areas involve the computation of an equilibrium or fixed point of some kind. Examples include Nash equilibria in games; market equilibria; computing optimal strategies and the values of competitive games…

We analyze the robustness of (pure strategy) Nash equilibria for network games against perturbations of the players' utility functions. We first derive a simple characterization of the margin of robustness, defined as the minimum magnitude…

This paper considers a distributed gossip approach for finding a Nash equilibrium in networked games on graphs. In such games a player's cost function may be affected by the actions of any subset of players. An interference graph is…

An important task in the analysis of multiagent systems is to understand how groups of selfish players can form coalitions, i.e., work together in teams. In this paper, we study the dynamics of coalition formation under bounded rationality.…

We initiate the study of the \emph{destruction model} (\aka \emph{adversary model}) introduced by Kliemann (2010), using the stability concept of \emph{swap equilibrium} introduced by Alon et. al (2010). The destruction model is a network…

We consider games of strategic substitutes and strategic complements on networks. We introduce two different evolutionary dynamics in order to refine their multiplicity of equilibria, and we analyse the system through a mean field approach.…