相关论文: Targeting Interventions in Networks

Consider a network game with linear best responses and spillovers between players, and let agents endogenously choose their links. A planner considers interventions to subsidize actions and/or links between players, aiming to maximize a…

Network games study the strategic interaction of agents connected through a network. Interventions in such a game -- actions a coordinator or planner may take that change the utility of the agents and thus shift the equilibrium action…

We study the optimal joint intervention of a planner who can influence both the standalone marginal utilities of agents in a network and the weights of the links connecting them. The welfare-maximizing intervention displays two key…

Consider a coordination game played on a network, where agents prefer taking actions closer to those of their neighbors and to their own ideal points in action space. We explore how the welfare outcomes of a coordination game depend on…

Using a general network model with multiple activities, we analyse a planner's welfare maximising interventions taking into account within-activity network spillovers and cross-activity interdependence. We show that the direction of the…

This paper studies the problem of optimally allocating treatments in the presence of spillover effects, using information from a (quasi-)experiment. I introduce a method that maximizes the sample analog of average social welfare when…

Interventions are made in networks to change the network or its values in a desired way. The intervention strategies evaluated in the study described here use network sampling designs to find units to which interventions are applied. An…

We consider two optimization problems in which a planner aims to influence the average transient opinion in the Friedkin-Johnsen dynamics on a network by intervening on the agents' innate opinions. Solving these problems requires full…

This paper studies the problem of intervention design for steering the actions of noncooperative players in quadratic network games to the social optimum. The players choose their actions with the aim of maximizing their individual payoff…

Many public health interventions are conducted in settings where individuals are connected to one another and the intervention assigned to randomly selected individuals may spill over to other individuals they are connected to. In these…

A principal uses payments conditioned on stochastic outcomes of a team project to elicit costly effort from the team members. We develop a multi-agent generalization of a classic first-order approach to contract optimization by leveraging…

We study network games in which players choose both the partners with whom they associate and an action level (e.g., effort) that creates spillovers for those partners. We introduce a framework and two solution concepts, extending standard…

In economic settings such as learning, social behavior, and financial contagion, agents interact through interdependent networks. This paper examines how a decision maker (DM) can design an optimal intervention strategy under network…

Many societal challenges, such as climate change or disease outbreaks, require coordinated behavioral changes. For many behaviors, the tendency of individuals to adhere to social norms can reinforce the status quo. However, these same…

Two types of interventions are commonly implemented in networks: characteristic intervention, which influences individuals' intrinsic incentives, and structural intervention, which targets the social links among individuals. In this paper…

Networked public goods games model scenarios in which self-interested agents decide whether or how much to invest in an action that benefits not only themselves, but also their network neighbors. Examples include vaccination, security…

We consider a setting where individuals interact in a network, each choosing actions which optimize utility as a function of neighbors' actions. A central authority aiming to maximize social welfare at equilibrium can intervene by paying…

We consider a multi-user network where a network manager and selfish users interact. The network manager monitors the behavior of users and intervenes in the interaction among users if necessary, while users make decisions independently to…

We consider reallocation problems in settings where the initial endowment of each agent consists of a subset of the resources. The private information of the players is their value for every possible subset of the resources. The goal is to…

In a social system, the self-interest of agents can be detrimental to the collective good, sometimes leading to social dilemmas. To resolve such a conflict, a central designer may intervene by either redesigning the system or incentivizing…