相关论文: Evolution of Cooperation in Public Goods Games wit…

This paper discusses the role of opportunistic punisher who may act selfishly to free-ride cooperators or not to be exploited by defectors. To consider opportunistic punisher, we make a change to the sequence of one-shot public good game;…

In a static environment, optional participation and a local agglomeration of cooperators are found to be beneficial for the occurrence and maintenance of cooperation. In the optional public goods game, the rock-scissors-paper cycles of…

Continuously changing environments have a paramount role in the evolution of cooperative behavior. Previous works have shown that the transitions among different games, as the feedback between behaviors and environments, can promote…

Over the past few decades, many works have studied the evolutionary dynamics of continuous games. However, previous works have primarily focused on two-player games with pairwise interactions. Indeed, group interactions rather than pairwise…

The public goods game is a broadly used paradigm for studying the evolution of cooperation in structured populations. According to the basic assumption, the interaction graph determines the connections of a player where the focal actor…

Many mathematical frameworks of evolutionary game dynamics assume that the total population size is constant and that selection affects only the relative frequency of strategies. Here, we consider evolutionary game dynamics in an extended…

Cooperation or defection and participation or withdrawal are well-known options of behavior in game-like activities in free societies, yet the co-evolutionary dynamics of these behavioral traits in the individual level are not well…

The evolution of cooperation has remained an important problem in evolutionary theory and social sciences. In this regard, a curious question is why consistent cooperative and defective personalities exist and if they serve a role in the…

The fact that individuals will most likely behave differently in different situations begets the introduction of conditional strategies. Inspired by this, we study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game, where besides…

Understanding the evolution of cooperation in multiplayer games is of vital significance for natural and social systems. An important challenge is that group interactions often leads to nonlinear synergistic effects. However, previous…

Productive societies feature high levels of cooperation and strong connections between individuals. Public Goods Games (PGGs) are frequently used to study the development of social connections and cooperative behavior in model societies. In…

Cooperation in repeated public goods game is hardly achieved, unless contingent behavior is present. Surely, if mechanisms promoting positive assortment between cooperators are present, then cooperators may beat defectors, because…

The emergence and maintenance of cooperative behavior is a fascinating topic in evolutionary biology and social science. The public goods game (PGG) is a paradigm for exploring cooperative behavior. In PGG, the total resulting payoff is…

In social dilemmas, individuals face a conflict between their own self-interest and the collective interest of the group. The provision of reward has been shown to be an effective means to drive cooperation in such situations. However,…

The Optional Public Goods Game is a three-strategy game in which an individual can play as a cooperator or defector or decide not to participate. Despite its simplicity, this model can effectively represent many human social dilemmas, such…

Most of previous studies concerning the Public Goods Game assume either participation is unconditional or the number of actual participants in a competitive group changes over time. How the fixed group size, prescribed by social…

Understanding how cooperation emerges in public goods games is crucial for addressing societal challenges. While optional participation can establish cooperation without identifying cooperators, it relies on specific assumptions -- that…

Direct reciprocity facilitates the evolution of cooperation when individuals interact repeatedly. Most previous studies on direct reciprocity implicitly assume compulsory interactions. Yet, interactions are often voluntary in human…

Tolerance implies enduring trying circumstances with a fair and objective attitude. To determine whether evolutionary advantages might be stemming from diverse levels of tolerance in a population, we study a spatial public goods game, where…

We study the combined influence of selection and random fluctuations on the evolutionary dynamics of two-strategy ("cooperation" and "defection") games in populations comprising cooperation facilitators. The latter are individuals that…