相关论文: Competitive Equilibrium with Indivisible Goods and…

The all-pay auction, a classic competitive model, is widely applied in scenarios such as political elections, sports competitions, and research and development, where all participants pay their bids regardless of winning or losing. However,…

Incorporating fairness criteria in optimization problems comes at a certain cost, which is measured by the so-called price of fairness. Here we consider the allocation of indivisible goods. For envy-freeness as fairness criterion it is…

We study fair allocation of indivisible chores to agents under budget constraints, where each chore has an objective size and disutility. This model captures scenarios where a set of chores need to be divided among agents with limited time,…

We study the allocation of indivisible goods under conflicting constraints, represented by a graph. In this framework, vertices correspond to goods and edges correspond to conflicts between a pair of goods. Each agent is allocated an…

In fair division, equitability dictates that each participant receives the same level of utility. In this work, we study equitable allocations of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. While prior work has studied…

Mechanism design is addressed in the context of fair allocations of indivisible goods with monetary compensation. Motivated by a real-world social choice problem, mechanisms with verification are considered in a setting where (i) agents'…

This paper establishes the existence of equilibrium in an economy with production and a continuum of consumers, each of whose incomplete and price-dependent preferences are defined on commodities they may consider deleterious, bads which…

We study the problem of distributing a set of indivisible items among agents with additive valuations in a $\mathit{fair}$ manner. The fairness notion under consideration is Envy-freeness up to any item (EFX). Despite significant efforts by…

We study a large economy in which firms cannot compute exact solutions to the non-linear equations that characterize the equilibrium price at which they can sell future output. Instead, firms use polynomial expansions to approximate prices.…

Frequent violations of fair principles in real-life settings raise the fundamental question of whether such principles can guarantee the existence of a self-enforcing equilibrium in a free economy. We show that elementary principles of…

We study fair resource allocation with strategic agents. It is well-known that, across multiple fundamental problems in this domain, truthfulness and fairness are incompatible. For example, when allocating indivisible goods, no truthful and…

We consider the problem of sharing a set of indivisible goods among agents in a fair manner, namely such that the allocation is envy-free up to any good (EFX). We focus on the problem of computing an EFX allocation in the two-agent case and…

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible items and a desirable heterogeneous divisible good (i.e., cake) to agents with additive utilities. In our paper, each indivisible item can be a good that yields non-negative utilities to…

We study the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating a set of items among strategic agents with additive valuations, where items are either all indivisible or all divisible. When items are goods, numerous positive and negative results…

The problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items is a well-known challenge in the field of (computational) social choice. In this scenario, there is a fundamental incompatibility between notions of fairness (such as envy-freeness…

We prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium in a production economy with infinitely many commodities and a measure space of agents whose preferences are price dependent. We employ a saturated measure space for the set of agents and…

We study the fair division of indivisible goods with conflicts between pairs of goods, represented by a graph $G = (V, E)$. We consider ``soft'' conflicts: assigning two adjacent goods to the same agent is allowed, but we seek allocations…

We study fair division of indivisible chores among $n$ agents with additive disutility functions. Two well-studied fairness notions for indivisible items are envy-freeness up to one/any item (EF1/EFX) and the standard notion of economic…

We study the question of existence and fast computation of fair and efficient allocations of indivisible resources among agents with additive valuations. As such allocations may not exist for arbitrary instances, we ask if they exist for…

We study the fair allocation of indivisible items for groups of agents from the perspectives of the agents and a centralized allocator. In our setting, the centralized allocator is interested in ensuring the allocation is fair among the…