相关论文: Statistical Cost Sharing

We consider collaborative systems where users make contributions across multiple available projects and are rewarded for their contributions in individual projects according to a local sharing of the value produced. This serves as a model…

The development of cluster computing frameworks has allowed practitioners to scale out various statistical estimation and machine learning algorithms with minimal programming effort. This is especially true for machine learning problems…

We present an unsupervised method for aggregating anomalies in tabular datasets by identifying the top-k tabular data quality insights. Each insight consists of a set of anomalous attributes and the corresponding subsets of records that…

This paper studies an energy storage (ES) sharing model which is cooperatively invested by multiple buildings for harnessing on-site renewable utilization and grid price arbitrage. To maximize the economic benefits, we jointly consider the…

In Network games under cooperative framework, the position value is a link based allocation rule. It is obtained from the Shapley value of an associated cooperative game where the links of the network are considered players. The Shapley…

A popular explainable AI (XAI) approach to quantify feature importance of a given model is via Shapley values. These Shapley values arose in cooperative games, and hence a critical ingredient to compute these in an XAI context is a…

Fair credit assignment is essential in various machine learning (ML) applications, and Shapley values have emerged as a valuable tool for this purpose. However, in critical ML applications such as data valuation and feature attribution, the…

We introduce a combinatorial variant of the cost sharing problem: several services can be provided to each player and each player values every combination of services differently. A publicly known cost function specifies the cost of…

Cooperative game is a critical research area in the multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). Global reward game is a subclass of cooperative games, where all agents aim to maximize the global reward. Credit assignment is an important…

We propose a coalition game model for the problem of communication for omniscience (CO). In this game model, the core contains all achievable rate vectors for CO with sum-rate being equal to a given value. Any rate vector in the core…

Myerson first introduced graph-restricted games in order to model the interaction of cooperative players with an underlying communication network. A dedicated solution concept -- the Myerson value -- is perhaps the most important normative…

Reliability-oriented sensitivity analysis aims at combining both reliability and sensitivity analyses by quantifying the influence of each input variable of a numerical model on a quantity of interest related to its failure. In particular,…

As data becomes the fuel driving technological and economic growth, a fundamental challenge is how to quantify the value of data in algorithmic predictions and decisions. For example, in healthcare and consumer markets, it has been…

Consider a setting where selfish agents are to be assigned to coalitions or projects from a fixed set P. Each project k is characterized by a valuation function; v_k(S) is the value generated by a set S of agents working on project k. We…

We consider the performance of a least-squares regression model, as judged by out-of-sample $R^2$. Shapley values give a fair attribution of the performance of a model to its input features, taking into account interdependencies between…

The cost-sharing connection game is a variant of routing games on a network. In this model, given a directed graph with edge costs and edge capacities, each agent wants to construct a path from a source to a sink with low cost. The users…

Motivated by the fact that the worth of a coalition may depend on the order in which agents arrive, Nowak and Radzik (1994) (NR) introduced cooperative games with generalized characteristic functions. We study such temporal cooperative…

In this paper, a novel framework for normative modeling of the spectrum sensing and sharing problem in cognitive radios (CRs) as a transferable utility (TU) cooperative game is proposed. Secondary users (SUs) jointly sense the spectrum and…

We investigate the distribution of the well-studied Shapley--Shubik values in weighted voting games where the agents are stochastically determined. The Shapley--Shubik value measures the voting power of an agent, in typical collective…

We extend the coopetition index introduced by Aleandri and Dall'Aglio (2025) for simple games to the broader class of monotone transferable utility (TU) games and to all non-empty coalitions, including singletons. The new formulation allows…