相关论文: Achieving rental harmony with a secretive roommate

In this work, inspired by secret sharing schemes, we introduce a privacy-preserving approach for network consensus, by which all nodes in a network can reach an agreement on their states without exposing the individual state to neighbors.…

The classic cake-cutting problem provides a model for addressing fair and efficient allocation of a divisible, heterogeneous resource (metaphorically, the cake) among agents with distinct preferences. Focusing on a standard formulation of…

We discuss coloring and partitioning questions related to Sperner's Lemma, originally motivated by an application in hardness of approximation. Informally, we call a partitioning of the $(k-1)$-dimensional simplex into $k$ parts, or a…

We consider the multi-unit random assignment problem in which agents express preferences over objects and objects are allocated to agents randomly based on the preferences. The most well-established preference relation to compare random…

We study the fair allocation of indivisible goods across groups of agents, where each agent fully enjoys all goods allocated to their group. We focus on groups of two (couples) and other groups of small size. For two couples, an EF1…

We study a problem where a group of agents has to decide how some fixed value should be shared among them. We are interested in settings where the share that each agent receives is based on how that agent is evaluated by other members of…

We define and study greedy matchings in vertex-ordered bipartite graphs. It is shown that each vertex-ordered bipartite graph has a unique greedy matching. The proof uses (a weak form of) Newman's lemma. The vertex ordering is called a…

We consider a fair division setting in which $m$ indivisible items are to be allocated among $n$ agents, where the agents have additive utilities and the agents' utilities for individual items are independently sampled from a distribution.…

We study the problem of fair division when the resources contain both divisible and indivisible goods. Classic fairness notions such as envy-freeness (EF) and envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) cannot be directly applied to the mixed goods…

Suppose there is a group of N people some of whom possess a specific property. For example, their wealth is above or below a threshold, they voted for a particular candidate, they have a certain disease, etc. The group wants to find out how…

Several resource allocation settings involve agents with unequal entitlements represented by weights. We analyze weighted fair division from an asymptotic perspective: if $m$ items are divided among $n$ agents whose utilities are…

Let $p_n$ denote the probability that a random instance of the stable roommates problem of size $n$ admits a solution. We derive an explicit formula for $p_n$ and compute exact values of $p_n$ for $n\leq 12$.

We introduce a model of fair division with market values, where indivisible goods must be partitioned among agents with (additive) subjective valuations, and each good additionally has a market value. The market valuation can be viewed as a…

A method is given for quantitatively rating the social acceptance of different options which are the matter of a preferential vote. In contrast to a previous article, here the individual votes are allowed to be incomplete, that is, they…

Explore-and-exploit tradeoffs play a key role in recommendation systems (RSs), aiming at serving users better by learning from previous interactions. Despite their commercial success, the societal effects of explore-and-exploit mechanisms…

We study stable matching problems with locality of information and control. In our model, each agent is a node in a fixed network and strives to be matched to another agent. An agent has a complete preference list over all other agents it…

One of the most direct human mechanisms of promoting cooperation is rewarding it. We study the effect of sharing a reward among cooperators in the most stringent form of social dilemma, namely the Prisoner's Dilemma. Specifically, for a…

In peer selection agents must choose a subset of themselves for an award or a prize. As agents are self-interested, we want to design algorithms that are impartial, so that an individual agent cannot affect their own chance of being…

We propose a simple probabilistic model to explain the spatial structure of the rent distribution of housing market in city of Sapporo. Here we modify the mathematical model proposed by Gauvin et. al. Especially, we consider the competition…

Cake cutting is a classic model for studying fair division of a heterogeneous, divisible resource among agents with individual preferences. Addressing cake division under a typical requirement that each agent must receive a connected piece…