相关论文: A "Quantal Regret" Method for Structural Econometr…
In multi-agent autonomous systems, deception is a fundamental concept which characterizes the exploitation of unbalanced information to mislead victims into choosing oblivious actions. This effectively alters the system's long term…
We study a multi-agent imitation learning (MAIL) problem where we take the perspective of a learner attempting to coordinate a group of agents based on demonstrations of an expert doing so. Most prior work in MAIL essentially reduces the…
We introduce a novel multi-armed bandit framework, where each arm is associated with a fixed unknown credal set over the space of outcomes (which can be richer than just the reward). The arm-to-credal-set correspondence comes from a known…
In practical applications, data is used to make decisions in two steps: estimation and optimization. First, a machine learning model estimates parameters for a structural model relating decisions to outcomes. Second, a decision is chosen to…
In this paper we propose a novel experimental design-based algorithm to minimize regret in online stochastic linear and combinatorial bandits. While existing literature tends to focus on optimism-based algorithms--which have been shown to…
We study online learning settings in which experts act strategically to maximize their influence on the learning algorithm's predictions by potentially misreporting their beliefs about a sequence of binary events. Our goal is twofold.…
Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) is a family of iterative algorithms that are the most popular and, in practice, fastest approach to approximately solving large imperfect-information games. In this paper we introduce novel CFR…
Recent simultaneous works by Peng and Rubinstein [2024] and Dagan et al. [2024] have demonstrated the existence of a no-swap-regret learning algorithm that can reach $\epsilon$ average swap regret against an adversary in any extensive-form…
Motivated by alternating learning dynamics in two-player games, a recent work by Cevher et al.(2024) shows that $o(\sqrt{T})$ alternating regret is possible for any $T$-round adversarial Online Linear Optimization (OLO) problem, and left as…
The behavior of no-regret learning algorithms is well understood in two-player min-max (i.e, zero-sum) games. In this paper, we investigate the behavior of no-regret learning in min-max games with dependent strategy sets, where the strategy…
Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) is a popular method to deal with decision-making problems of two-player zero-sum games with imperfect information. Unlike existing studies that mostly explore for solving larger scale problems or…
Modelling agent preferences has applications in a range of fields including economics and increasingly, artificial intelligence. These preferences are not always known and thus may need to be estimated from observed behavior, in which case…
We study Bayesian learning in episodic, finite-horizon zero-sum Markov games with unknown transition and reward models. We investigate a posterior algorithm in which each player maintains a Bayesian posterior over the game model,…
The problem of matching markets has been studied for a long time in the literature due to its wide range of applications. Finding a stable matching is a common equilibrium objective in this problem. Since market participants are usually…
In the classic expert problem, $\Phi$-regret measures the gap between the learner's total loss and that achieved by applying the best action transformation $\phi \in \Phi$. A recent work by Lu et al., [2025] introduces an adaptive algorithm…
Simple adaptive procedures that converge to correlated equilibria are known to exist for normal form games (Hart and Mas-Colell 2000), but no such analogue exists for extensive-form games. Leveraging inspiration from Zinkevich et al.…
We present a new anytime algorithm that achieves near-optimal regret for any instance of finite stochastic partial monitoring. In particular, the new algorithm achieves the minimax regret, within logarithmic factors, for both "easy" and…
How should a player who repeatedly plays a game against a no-regret learner strategize to maximize his utility? We study this question and show that under some mild assumptions, the player can always guarantee himself a utility of at least…
Understanding the behavior of no-regret dynamics in general $N$-player games is a fundamental question in online learning and game theory. A folk result in the field states that, in finite games, the empirical frequency of play under…
We develop a methodology for constructing confidence sets for parameters of statistical models via a reduction to sequential prediction. Our key observation is that for any generalized linear model (GLM), one can construct an associated…