相关论文: On Arithmetical Truth of the Self-Referential Sent…
In this paper, we give a detailed account of Goldfeld's proof of Siegel's theorem. Particularly, we present complete proofs of the nontrivial assumptions made in his paper.
If no optimal propositional proof system exists, we (and independently Pudl\'ak) prove that ruling out length $t$ proofs of any unprovable sentence is hard. This mapping from unprovable to hard-to-prove sentences powerfully translates facts…
A detailed and rigorous analysis of G\"odel's proof of his first incompleteness theorem is presented. The purpose of this analysis is two-fold. The first is to reveal what G\"odel actually proved to provide a clear and solid foundation upon…
G\"odel's argument for the First Incompleteness Theorem is, structurally, a proof by contradiction. This article intends to reframe the argument by, first, isolating an additional assumption the argument relies on, and then, second, arguing…
We present the first class of mathematically rigorous, general, fully self-referential, self-improving, optimally efficient problem solvers. Inspired by Kurt Goedel's celebrated self-referential formulas (1931), such a problem solver…
We argue that Godel's completeness theorem is equivalent to completability of consistent theories, and Godel's incompleteness theorem is equivalent to the fact that this completion is not constructive, in the sense that there are some…
There is a longstanding debate in the logico-philosophical community as to why the G\"odelian sentences of a consistent and sufficiently strong theory are true. The prevalent argument seems to be something like this: since every one of the…
In this paper we examine various requirements on the formalisation choices under which self-reference can be adequately formalised in arithmetic. In particular, we study self-referential numberings, which immediately provide a strong notion…
In 1931, G\"odel presented in K\"onigsberg his famous Incompleteness Theorem, stating that some true mathematical statements are unprovable. Yet, this result gives us no idea about those independent (that is, true and unprovable)…
This paper examines the application of Tarski's Undefinability Theorem to first-order arithmetic. The generally accepted view is that for this case the Theorem establishes that arithmetic truth is not arithmetic. A careful examination of…
We consider the thesis that an arithmetical relation, which holds for any, given, assignment of natural numbers to its free variables, is Turing-decidable if, and only if, it is the standard representation of a PA-provable formula. We show…
By closely rereading the original Turing's 1936 article, we can gain insight about that it is based on the claim to have defined a number which is not computable, arguing that there can be no machine computing the diagonal on the…
In an earlier paper, "Omega-inconsistency in Goedel's formal system: a constructive proof of the Entscheidungsproblem" (math/0206302), I argued that a constructive interpretation of Goedel's reasoning establishes any formal system of…
A formula $\phi$ is called \emph{$n$-provable} in a formal arithmetical theory $S$ if $\phi$ is provable in $S$ together with all true arithmetical $\Pi_{n}$-sentences taken as additional axioms. While in general the set of all $n$-provable…
The proofs that the real numbers are denumerable will be shown, i.e., that there exists one-to-one correspondence between the natural numbers $N$ and the real numbers $\Re$. The general element of the sequence that contains all real numbers…
This is a companion to a paper by the authors entitled "G\"odel on deduction", which examined the links between some philosophical views ascribed to G\"odel and general proof theory. When writing that other paper, the authors were not…
Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem is generalized to definable theories, which are not necessarily recursively enumerable, by using a couple of syntactic-semantic notions, one is the consistency of a theory with the set of all true…
This paper gives a counterexample to the impossibility, by G\"odel's second incompleteness theorem, of proving a formula expressing the consistency of arithmetic in a fragment of arithmetic on the assumption that the latter is consistent.…
We distinguish finitarily between algorithmic verifiability, and algorithmic computability, to show that Goedel's 'formally' unprovable, but 'numeral-wise' provable, arithmetical proposition [(Ax)R(x)] can be finitarily evidenced as:…
It is generally accepted that the incompleteness of first-order number theory (PA) is established by an application of Godel's proof. This paper shows that the arithmetization of the syntax of PA implies that the hypothesised class of PA…