相关论文: Characterizing Solution Concepts in Terms of Commo…

We study the computational complexity of finding Stackelberg Equilibria in general-sum games, where the set of pure strategies of the leader and the followers are exponentially large in a natrual representation of the problem. In…

This document consists of two parts: the second part was submitted earlier as a new proof of Nash's theorem, and the first part is a note explaining a problem found in that proof. We are indebted to Sergiu Hart and Eran Shmaya for their…

This letter reports a novel application of game theory to quantum informational processes which can be used to optimally classify data generated by these processes. To this end, the notion of simultaneously distinguishing a pure quantum…

Nash equilibria are crucial for understanding game behavior and systems in economics, physics, biology, and computer science. A significant application arises from the connection between Nash equilibria and optimization problems . However,…

The sequential equilibrium is a standard solution concept for extensive-form games with imperfect information that includes an explicit representation of the players' beliefs. An assessment consisting of a strategy and a belief is a…

This paper introduces a new solution concept for non-cooperative games in normal form with no ties and pure strategies: the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium. The players are rational in all possible worlds and know each other's strategies…

A model of stochastic games where multiple controllers jointly control the evolution of the state of a dynamic system but have access to different information about the state and action processes is considered. The asymmetry of information…

We study equilibrium concepts in non-cooperative games under uncertainty where both beliefs and mixed strategies are represented by non-additive measures (capacities). In contrast to the classical Nash framework based on additive…

We study a Stackelberg strategy subject to the evolutionary linearized micropolar fluids equations in domains with moving boundaries, considering a Nash multi-objective equilibrium (non necessarily cooperative) for the "follower players"…

We study surplus division in network constrained bilateral matching markets with transferable utility. We introduce a new solution concept, the credible bargaining solution, which refines stability by requiring that, for each matched pair…

This paper investigates full stability properties for \emph{variational Nash equilibriums} of a system of parametric nonconvex optimal control problems governed by semilinear elliptic partial differential equations. We first obtain some new…

This paper presents a plausible reasoning system to illustrate some broad issues in knowledge representation: dualities between different reasoning forms, the difficulty of unifying complementary reasoning styles, and the approximate nature…

A quantum Cournot game of which classical form game has multiple Nash equilibria is examined. Although the classical equilibria fail to be Pareto optimal, the quantum equilibrium exhibits the following two properties, (i) if the measurement…

In this work, we develop a reward design framework for installing a desired behavior as a strict equilibrium across standard solution concepts: dominant strategy equilibrium, Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, and coarse correlated…

A recently introduced concept of "cooperative equilibrium", based on the assumption that players have a natural attitude to cooperation, has been proven a powerful tool in predicting human behaviour in social dilemmas. In this paper, we…

Noncooperative games with uncertain payoffs have been classically studied under the expected-utility theory framework, which relies on the strong assumption that agents behave rationally. However, simple experiments on human decision makers…

We consider the common-knowledge paradox raised by Halpern and Moses: common knowledge is necessary for agreement and coordination, but common knowledge is unattainable in the real world because of temporal imprecision. We discuss two…

To generalize complementarities for games, we introduce some conditions weaker than quasisupermodularity and the single crossing property. We prove that the Nash equilibria of a game satisfying these conditions form a nonempty complete…

We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…

It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic…