相关论文: Characterizing Solution Concepts in Terms of Commo…
In the framework of finite games in extensive form with perfect information and strict preferences, this paper introduces a new equilibrium concept: the Perfect Prediction Equilibrium (PPE). In the Nash paradigm, rational players consider…
It is frequently suggested that predictions made by game theory could be improved by considering computational restrictions when modeling agents. Under the supposition that players in a game may desire to balance maximization of payoff with…
This work proposes a novel set of techniques for approximating a Nash equilibrium in a finite, normal-form game. It achieves this by constructing a new reformulation as solving a parameterized system of multivariate polynomials with tunable…
The Nash Equilibrium is a much discussed, deceptively complex, method for the analysis of non-cooperative games. If one reads many of the commonly available definitions the description of the Nash Equilibrium is deceptively simple in…
Correlated equilibria -- and their generalization $\Phi$-equilibria -- are a fundamental object of study in game theory, offering a more tractable alternative to Nash equilibria in multi-player settings. While computational aspects of…
This paper studies generalized Nash equilibrium problems that are given by rational functions. The optimization problems are not assumed to be convex. Rational expressions for Lagrange multipliers and feasible extensions of KKT points are…
Economists were content with the concept of the Nash equilibrium as game theory's solution concept until Daskalakis, Goldberg, and Papadimitriou showed that finding a Nash equilibrium is most likely a computationally hard problem, a result…
Many models from a variety of areas involve the computation of an equilibrium or fixed point of some kind. Examples include Nash equilibria in games; market equilibria; computing optimal strategies and the values of competitive games…
Game theoretic equilibria are mathematical expressions of rationality. Rational agents are used to model not only humans and their software representatives, but also organisms, populations, species and genes, interacting with each other and…
Game-theoretic techniques and equilibria analysis facilitate the design and verification of competitive systems. While algorithmic complexity of equilibria computation has been extensively studied, practical implementation and application…
We consider solutions of normal form games that are invariant under strategic equivalence. We consider additional properties that can be expected (or be desired) from a solution of a game, and we observe the following: - Even the weakest…
Finding, counting, or determining the existence of Nash equilibria, where players must play optimally given each others' actions, are known to be computational intractable problems. We ask whether weakening optimality to the requirement…
Nash Equilibrium (NE) is the canonical solution concept of game theory, which provides an elegant tool to understand the rationalities. Though mixed strategy NE exists in any game with finite players and actions, computing NE in two- or…
The concept of Nash equilibrium in behavioral strategies (NashEBS) was formulated By Nash~\cite{Nash (1951)} for an extensive-form game through global rationality of nonconvex payoff functions. Kuhn's payoff equivalence theorem resolves the…
Nash equilibrium is a common solution concept that captures strategic interaction in electricity market analysis. However, it requires a fundamental but impractical assumption that all market participants are fully rational, implying…
Every real algebraic variety is isomorphic to the set of totally mixed Nash equilibria of some three-person game, and also to the set of totally mixed Nash equilibria of an $N$-person game in which each player has two pure strategies. From…
A \emph{new} notion of equilibrium, which we call \emph{strong equilibrium}, is introduced for time-inconsistent stopping problems in continuous time. Compared to the existing notions introduced in ArXiv: 1502.03998 and ArXiv: 1709.05181,…
We deal with the generalized Nash game proposed by Rosen, which is a game with strategy sets that are coupled across players through a shared constraint. A reduction to a classical game is shown, and as a consequence, Rosen's result can be…
Variational relation problems allow a general approach for variational inequalities, equilibrium problems, optimization problems, variational inclusions. In this paper we consider a system of quasi-variational relations and determine some…
We introduce language-based games, a generalization of psychological games [6] that can also capture reference-dependent preferences [7]. The idea is to extend the domain of the utility function to situations, maximal consistent sets in…