相关论文: Optimal Bounds for the No-Show Paradox via SAT Sol…

A fundamental principle of individual rational choice is Sen's $\gamma$ axiom, also known as expansion consistency, stating that any alternative chosen from each of two menus must be chosen from the union of the menus. Expansion consistency…

The classical paradox of social choice theory asserts that there is no fair way to deterministically select a winner in an election among more than two candidates; the only definite collective preferences are between individual pairs of…

We consider the problem of finding a compromise between the opinions of a group of individuals on a number of mutually independent, binary topics. In this paper, we quantify the loss in representativeness that results from requiring the…

Condorcet domains are fundamental objects in the theory of majority voting; they are sets of linear orders with the property that if every voter picks a linear order from this set, assuming that the number of voters is odd, and alternatives…

The Boolean satisfiability problem (SAT) is a well-known example of monotonic reasoning, of intense practical interest due to fast solvers, complemented by rigorous fine-grained complexity results. However, for non-monotonic reasoning,…

May's classical theorem states that in a single-winner choose-one voting system with just two candidates, majority rule is the only social choice function satisfying anonimity, neutrality and positive responsiveness axiom. Anonimity and…

We study the probability that a given candidate is an alpha-winner, i.e. a candidate preferred to each other candidate j by a fraction alpha_j of the voters. This extends the classical notion of Condorcet winner, which corresponds to the…

In many real world situations, collective decisions are made using voting and, in scenarios such as committee or board elections, employing voting rules that return multiple winners. In multi-winner approval voting (AV), an agent submits a…

We analyze the winning coalitions that arise under Bloc voting when voters preferences are single-peaked. For small numbers of candidates and numbers of winners, we determine conditions under which candidates in winning coalitions are…

A tournament organizer must select one of $n$ possible teams as the winner of a competition after observing all $\binom{n}{2}$ matches between them. The organizer would like to find a tournament rule that simultaneously satisfies the…

There is a long tradition of fruitful interaction between logic and social choice theory. In recent years, much of this interaction has focused on computer-aided methods such as SAT solving and interactive theorem proving. In this paper, we…

The ability to measure the satisfaction of (groups of) voters is a crucial prerequisite for formulating proportionality axioms in approval-based participatory budgeting elections. Two common - but very different - ways to measure the…

It is well known that no reasonable voting rule is strategyproof. Moreover, the common Plurality rule is particularly prone to strategic behavior of the voters and empirical studies show that people often vote strategically in practice.…

Arrow's Impossibility Theorem is a seminal result of Social Choice Theory that demonstrates the impossibility of ranked-choice decision-making processes to jointly satisfy a number of intuitive and seemingly desirable constraints. The…

We study the problem of designing voting rules that take as input the ordinal preferences of $n$ agents over a set of $m$ alternatives and output a single alternative, aiming to optimize the overall happiness of the agents. The input to the…

The Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP) framework offers a simple and sound basis for representing and solving simple decision problems, without uncertainty. This paper is devoted to an extension of the CSP framework enabling us to deal…

A group of privately informed agents chooses between two alternatives. How should the decision rule be designed if agents are known to be biased in favor of one of the options? We address this question by considering the Condorcet Jury…

In frequently repeated matching scenarios, individuals may require diversification in their choices. Therefore, when faced with a set of potential outcomes, each individual may have an ideal lottery over outcomes that represents their…

Apportionment is the act of distributing the seats of a legislature among political parties (or states) in proportion to their vote shares (or populations). A famous impossibility by Balinski and Young (2001) shows that no apportionment…

We examine strategy-proof elections to select a winner amongst a set of agents, each of whom cares only about winning. This impartial selection problem was introduced independently by Holzman and Moulin and Alon et al. Fisher and Klimm…