相关论文: On the Role of Side Information In Strategic Commu…

We investigate the problem of strategic point-to-point communication with side information at the decoder, in which the encoder and the decoder have mismatched distortion functions. The decoding process is not supervised, it returns the…

In this article, we investigate strategic information transmission over a noisy channel. This problem has been widely investigated in Economics, when the communication channel is perfect. Unlike in Information Theory, both encoder and…

This paper analyzes the fundamental limit of the strategic semantic communication problem in which a transmitter obtains a limited number of indirect observation of an intrinsic semantic information source and can then influence the…

This paper analyzes the information disclosure problems originated in economics through the lens of information theory. Such problems are radically different from the conventional communication paradigms in information theory since they…

We propose a strategic formulation for the joint source-channel coding problem in which the encoder and the decoder are endowed with distinct distortion functions. We provide the solutions in four different scenarios. First, we assume that…

Strategic information disclosure, in its simplest form, considers a game between an information provider (sender) who has access to some private information that an information receiver is interested in. While the receiver takes an action…

We analyze Stackelberg Gaussian signaling games where the encoder and decoder have a linear sensitivity mismatch. Unlike the standard additive-bias model, a sensitivity mismatch means the encoder prefers the decoder to track a linear…

In decentralized decision-making problems, communicating agents choose their actions based on locally available information and knowledge about decision rules or strategies of other agents. In this work, we consider a strategic…

We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information…

This paper analyzes a finite horizon dynamic signaling game motivated by the well-known strategic information transmission problems in economics. The mathematical model involves information transmission between two agents, a sender who…

In decentralized decision-making problems, agents choose their actions based on locally available information and knowledge about decision rules or strategies of other agents. We consider a three-node cascade network with an encoder, a…

Semantic communications (SC) is an emerging communication paradigm in which wireless devices can send only relevant information from a source of data while relying on computing resources to regenerate missing data points. However, the…

This paper studies a Stackelberg game wherein a sender (leader) attempts to shape the information of a less informed receiver (follower) who in turn takes an action that determines the payoff for both players. The sender chooses signals to…

This paper studies communication scenarios where the transmitter and the receiver have different objectives due to privacy concerns, in the context of a variation of the strategic information transfer (SIT) model of Sobel and Crawford. We…

In this paper, we model a Stackelberg game in a simple Gaussian test channel where a human transmitter (leader) communicates a source message to a human receiver (follower). We model human decision making using prospect theory models…

A lossy source coding problem is studied in which a source encoder communicates with two decoders, one with and one without correlated side information with an additional constraint on the privacy of the side information at the uninformed…

Semantic communication systems often use an end-to-end neural network to map input data into continuous symbols. These symbols, which are essentially neural network features, usually have fixed dimensions and heavy-tailed distributions.…

This paper analyzes a dynamic interaction between a fully rational, privately informed sender and a boundedly rational, uninformed receiver with memory constraints. The sender controls the flow of information, while the receiver designs a…

In this paper, we investigate the coordination of autonomous devices with non-aligned utility functions. Both encoder and decoder are considered as players, that choose the encoding and the decoding in order to maximize their long-run…

The coordination of autonomous agents is a critical issue for decentralized communication networks. Instead of transmitting information, the agents interact in a coordinated manner in order to optimize a general objective function. A target…