相关论文: Quantitative Games under Failures

In many multiagent environments, a designer has some, but limited control over the game being played. In this paper, we formalize this by considering incompletely specified games, in which some entries of the payoff matrices can be chosen…

We discuss the connection between a class of distributed quantum games, with remotely located players, to the counter intuitive Braess' paradox of traffic flow that is an important design consideration in generic networks where the addition…

We study multiplayer quantitative reachability games played on a finite directed graph, where the objective of each player is to reach his target set of vertices as quickly as possible. Instead of the well-known notion of Nash equilibrium…

In this paper, we propose and analyse two game theoretical models useful to design marketing channels attribution mechanisms based on cooperative TU games and bankruptcy problems, respectively. First, we analyse the Sum Game, a coalitional…

Negotiations, a model of concurrency with multi party negotiation as primitive, have been recently introduced by J. Desel and J. Esparza. We initiate the study of games for this model. We study coalition problems: can a given coalition of…

In a zero-sum stochastic game with signals, at each stage, two adversary players take decisions and receive a stage payoff determined by these decisions and a variable called state. The state follows a Markov chain, that is controlled by…

We study the interaction between a network designer and an adversary over a dynamical network. The network consists of nodes performing continuous-time distributed averaging. The adversary strategically disconnects a set of links to prevent…

The concept of intransitiveness for games, which is the condition for which there is no first-player winning strategy can arise surprisingly, as happens in the Penney game, an extension of the heads or tails. Since a game can be converted…

Two-player quantitative zero-sum games provide a natural framework to synthesize controllers with performance guarantees for reactive systems within an uncontrollable environment. Classical settings include mean-payoff games, where the…

We introduce and study coverage games - a novel framework for multi-agent planning in settings in which a system operates several agents but does not have full control on them, or interacts with an environment that consists of several…

Traditionally quantitative games such as mean-payoff games and discount sum games have two players -- one trying to maximize the payoff, the other trying to minimize it. The associated decision problem, "Can Eve (the maximizer) achieve, for…

Two-player games on graphs provide the mathematical foundation for the study of reactive systems. In the quantitative framework, an objective assigns a value to every play, and the goal of player 1 is to minimize the value of the objective.…

We study $n$-player turn-based games played on a finite directed graph. For each play, the players have to pay a cost that they want to minimize. Instead of the well-known notion of Nash equilibrium (NE), we focus on the notion of subgame…

We consider two-player stochastic games played on a finite graph for infinitely many rounds. Stochastic games generalize both Markov decision processes (MDP) by adding an adversary player, and two-player deterministic games by adding…

Game Logic with sabotage ($\mathsf{GL_s}$) is introduced as a simple and natural extension of Parikh's game logic with a single additional primitive, which allows players to lay traps for the opponent. $\mathsf{GL_s}$ can be used to model…

We consider two-player games played in real time on game structures with clocks where the objectives of players are described using parity conditions. The games are \emph{concurrent} in that at each turn, both players independently propose…

A central question in routing games has been to establish conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium, either in terms of network topology or in terms of costs. This question is well understood in two classes of routing games. The…

In a two-player zero-sum graph game the players move a token throughout a graph to produce an infinite path, which determines the winner or payoff of the game. Traditionally, the players alternate turns in moving the token. In {\em bidding…

Stochastic games with discounted payoff, introduced by Shapley, model adversarial interactions in stochastic environments where two players try to optimize a discounted sum of rewards. In this model, long-term weights are geometrically…

In this paper, we introduce malicious Bayesian congestion games as an extension to congestion games where players might act in a malicious way. In such a game each player has two types. Either the player is a rational player seeking to…