相关论文: Interdependent Security with Strategic Agents and …

Transmission of disease, spread of information and rumors, adoption of new products, and many other network phenomena can be fruitfully modeled as cascading processes, where actions chosen by nodes influence the subsequent behavior of…

We consider a class of interdependent security games on networks where each node chooses a personal level of security investment. The attack probability experienced by a node is a function of her own investment and the investment by her…

We study the influence of degree correlations or network mixing in interdependent security. We model the interdependence in security among agents using a dependence graph and employ a population game model to capture the interaction among…

We study the incentives that agents have to invest in costly protection against cascading failures in networked systems. Applications include vaccination, computer security and airport security. Agents are connected through a network and…

We study cascading failures in a system comprising interdependent networks/systems, in which nodes rely on other nodes both in the same system and in other systems to perform their function. The (inter-)dependence among nodes is modeled…

We study a network formation game where agents receive benefits by forming connections to other agents but also incur both direct and indirect costs from the formed connections. Specifically, once the agents have purchased their…

In this paper, we investigate game-theoretic strategies for containing spreading processes on large-scale networks. Specifically, we consider the class of networked susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) epidemics where a large population…

Understanding cascading failures or epidemics in networks is crucial for developing effective defensive mechanisms for many critical systems and infrastructures (e.g. biological, social and cyber networks). Most of the existing works treat…

We consider a system consisting of multiple interdependent assets, and a set of defenders, each responsible for securing a subset of the assets against an attacker. The interdependencies between the assets are captured by an attack graph,…

This paper studies a stochastic game theoretic approach to security and intrusion detection in communication and computer networks. Specifically, an Attacker and a Defender take part in a two-player game over a network of nodes whose…

An epidemic spreading in a network calls for a decision on the part of the network members: They should decide whether to protect themselves or not. Their decision depends on the trade-off between their perceived risk of being infected and…

A digital security breach, by which confidential information is leaked, does not only affect the agent whose system is infiltrated, but is also detrimental to other agents socially connected to the infiltrated system. Although it has been…

Exploring the internal mechanism of information spreading is critical for understanding and controlling the process. Traditional spreading models often assume individuals play the same role in the spreading process. In reality, however,…

Epidemic spreading and cascading failure are two important dynamical processes over complex networks. They have been investigated separately for a long history. But in the real world, these two dynamics sometimes may interact with each…

Firms in inter-organizational networks such as supply chains or strategic alliances are exposed to interdependent risks. These are risks that are transferable across partner firms. They can be decomposed into intrinsic risks a firm faces…

The spread of new ideas, behaviors or technologies has been extensively studied using epidemic models. Here we consider a model of diffusion where the individuals' behavior is the result of a strategic choice. We study a simple coordination…

The dynamics of cascading activation, such as rapid changes in public opinion and the outbreak of disease epidemics, have a crucial dependence on the connectivity patterns among the agents. We study cascading dynamics in modular,…

We study decentralized protection strategies against Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) epidemics on networks. We consider a population game framework where nodes choose whether or not to vaccinate themselves, and the epidemic risk is…

We introduce a probabilistic framework that represents stylized banking networks with the aim of predicting the size of contagion events. Most previous work on random financial networks assumes independent connections between banks, whereas…

In many cases of attacks or failures, memory effects play a significant role. Therefore, we present a model that not only considers the dependencies between nodes but also incorporates the memory effects of attacks. Our research…