相关论文: Limit Cycles Sparked by Mutation in the Repeated P…
We will study a population of individuals playing the infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma under replicator dynamics. The population consists of three kinds of individuals using the following reactive strategies: ALLD (individuals which…
To understand the emergence and sustainment of cooperative behavior in interacting collectives, we perform global convergence analysis for replicator dynamics of a large, well-mixed population of individuals playing a repeated snowdrift…
When people play a repeated game they usually try to anticipate their opponents' moves based on past observations, and then decide what action to take next. Behavioural economics studies the mechanisms by which strategic decisions are taken…
Cooperators benefit others with paying costs. Evolution of cooperation crucially depends on the cost-benefit ratio of cooperation, denoted as $c$. In this work, we investigate the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma for various values of…
The prisoner's dilemma describes a conflict between a pair of players, in which defection is a dominant strategy whereas cooperation is collectively optimal. The iterated version of the dilemma has been extensively studied to understand the…
One of the most important questions in game theory concerns how mutual cooperation can be achieved and maintained in a social dilemma. In Axelrod's tournaments of the iterated prisoner's dilemma, Tit-for-Tat (TFT) demonstrated the role of…
Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games are studied with players located on square lattice and random regular graphs defining four neighbors for each one. The players follow one of the three strategies: tit-for-tat, unconditional cooperation,…
Direct reciprocity, stemming from repeated interactions among players, is one of the fundamental mechanisms for understanding the evolution of cooperation. However, canonical strategies for the repeated prisoner's dilemma, such as…
The emergence of mutual cooperation is studied in a spatially extended evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game in which the players are located on the sites of cubic lattices for dimensions d=1, 2, and 3. Each player can choose one of the…
I present the results from a spatial model of the prisoner's dilemma, played on a toroidal lattice. Each individual has a default strategy of either cooperating ($C$) or defecting ($D$). Two strategies were tested, including ``tit-for-tat''…
We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game, where besides unconditional cooperation and defection, tit-for-tat, win-stay-lose-shift and extortion are the five competing strategies. While pairwise imitation…
Game theory deals with strategic interactions among players and evolutionary game dynamics tracks the fate of the players' populations under selection. In this paper, we consider the replicator equation for two-player-two-strategy games…
Recently, an evolutionary game dynamics model taking into account the environmental feedback has been proposed to describe the co-evolution of strategic actions of a population of individuals and the state of the surrounding environment;…
We seek a route to the equilibrium where all the agents cooperate in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game on a two-dimensional plane, focusing on the role of tit-for-tat strategy. When a time horizon, within which a strategy can recall the…
The remarkable adaptability of humans in response to complex environments is often demonstrated by the context-dependent adoption of different behavioral modes. However, the existing game-theoretic studies mostly focus on the single-mode…
While many theoretical studies have revealed the strategies that could lead to and maintain cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, less is known about what human participants actually do in this game and how strategies change when…
This paper characterizes how different incentive instruments shape cooperation in a repeated Prisoner`s Dilemma with a continuum of players. A simple tit-for-tat strategy competes against unconditional defection, and the long-run outcome is…
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma(IPD) is a well-known benchmark for studying the long term behaviors of rational agents, such as how cooperation can emerge among selfish and unrelated agents that need to co-exist over long term. Many well-known…
In diluted lattices, cooperation is often enhanced at specific densities, particularly near the percolation threshold for stochastic updating rules. However, the Replicator rule, despite being probabilistic, does not follow this trend. We…
Competition among cooperators, defectors, and loners is studied in an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with optional participation. Loners are risk averse i.e. unwilling to participate and rather rely on small but fixed earnings. This…