相关论文: Markovian Nash equilibrium in financial markets wi…
A Markovian modulation captures the trend in the market and influences the market coefficients accordingly. The different scenarios presented by the market are modeled as the distinct states of a discrete-time Markov chain. In our paper, we…
We consider $n$ risk-averse agents who compete for liquidity in an Almgren--Chriss market impact model. Mathematically, this situation can be described by a Nash equilibrium for a certain linear-quadratic differential game with state…
The paper studies an oligopolistic equilibrium model of financial agents who aim to share their random endowments. The risk-sharing securities and their prices are endogenously determined as the outcome of a strategic game played among all…
This paper is concerned with a linear-quadratic non-zero sum differential game with asymmetric delayed information. To be specific, two players exist time delays simultaneously which are different, leading the dynamical system being an…
This paper studies a stochastic utility maximization game under relative performance concerns in finite agent and infinite agent settings, where a continuum of agents interact through a graphon (see definition below). We consider an…
We develop a theory for continuous-time non-Markovian stochastic control problems which are inherently time-inconsistent. Their distinguishing feature is that the classical Bellman optimality principle no longer holds. Our formulation is…
We prove the global existence of an incomplete, continuous-time finite-agent Radner equilibrium in which exponential agents optimize their expected utility over both running consumption and terminal wealth. The market consists of a traded…
In this paper we present a scalable deep learning framework for finding Markovian Nash Equilibria in multi-agent stochastic games using fictitious play. The motivation is inspired by theoretical analysis of Forward Backward Stochastic…
In a Markovian stochastic volatility model, we consider financial agents whose investment criteria are modelled by forward exponential performance processes. The problem of contingent claim indifference valuation is first addressed and a…
We investigate a portfolio selection problem involving multi competitive agents, each exhibiting mean-variance preferences. Unlike classical models, each agent's utility is determined by their relative wealth compared to the average wealth…
The topics treated in this thesis are inherently two-fold. The first part considers the problem of a market maker optimally setting bid/ask quotes over a finite time horizon, to maximize her expected utility. The intensities of the orders…
We study discrete-time mean-field Markov games with infinite numbers of agents where each agent aims to minimize its ergodic cost. We consider the setting where the agents have identical linear state transitions and quadratic cost…
The modelling of modern power markets requires the representation of the following main features: (i) a stochastic dynamic decision process, with uncertainties related to renewable production and fuel costs, among others; and (ii) a…
We consider two market designs for a network of prosumers, trading energy: (i) a centralized design which acts as a benchmark, and (ii) a peer-to-peer market design. High renewable energy penetration requires that the energy market design…
This paper investigates the efficiency loss in social cost caused by strategic bidding behavior of individual participants in a supply-demand balancing market, and proposes a mechanism to fully recover equilibrium social optimum via…
We consider a multi-player stochastic differential game with linear McKean-Vlasov dynamics and quadratic cost functional depending on the variance and mean of the state and control actions of the players in open-loop form. Finite and…
This paper studies a competitive optimal portfolio selection problem in a model where the interest rate, the appreciation rate and volatility rate of the risky asset are all stochastic processes, thus forming a non-Markovian financial…
Central results in economics guarantee the existence of efficient equilibria for various classes of markets. An underlying assumption in early work is that agents are price-takers, i.e., agents honestly report their true demand in response…
We consider a stochastic game with partial, asymmetric and non-classical information, where the agents are trying to acquire as many available opportunities/locks as possible. Agents have access only to local information, the information…
We construct Nash equilibria in feedback form for a class of two-person stochastic games of singular control with absorption, arising from a stylized model for corporate finance. More precisely, the paper focusses on a strategic dynamic…