相关论文: Knightian Robustness of Single-Parameter Domains

We study the structural complexity of bimatrix games, formalized via rank, from an empirical perspective. We consider a setting where we have data on player behavior in diverse strategic situations, but where we do not observe the relevant…

Researchers have explored the performance of Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma strategies for decades, from the celebrated performance of Tit for Tat to the introduction of the zero-determinant strategies and the use of sophisticated learning…

Repeated game has long been the touchstone model for agents' long-run relationships. Previous results suggest that it is particularly difficult for a repeated game player to exert an autocratic control on the payoffs since they are jointly…

"Norton's Dome" is an example of a Newtonian system that violates the Lipschitz condition at a single point, leading to non-unique solutions (indeterminism). Here we reformulate this problem into a "weak" form (in the sense of…

Research regarding the stable marriage and roommate problem has a long and distinguished history in mathematics, computer science and economics. Stability in this context is predominantly core stability or one of its variants in which each…

Motivated by the scarcity of accurate payoff feedback in practical applications of game theory, we examine a class of learning dynamics where players adjust their choices based on past payoff observations that are subject to noise and…

Though robustness of networks to random attacks has been widely studied, intentional destruction by an intelligent agent is not tractable with previous methods. Here we devise a single-player game on a lattice that mimics the logic of an…

We introduce a novel equilibrium concept that incorporates Knightian uncertainty into the cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin, 2005). This concept is then applied to a two-player game in which agents can engage in trade or refuse to do so.…

Evolutionary game theory is a powerful mathematical framework to study how intelligent individuals adjust their strategies in collective interactions. It has been widely believed that it is impossible to unilaterally control players'…

We examine the advantages that quantum strategies afford in communication-limited games. Inspired by the card game blackjack, we focus on cooperative, two-party sequential games in which a single classical bit of communication is allowed…

We consider a security game in a setting consisting of two players (an attacker and a defender), each with a given budget to allocate towards attack and defense, respectively, of a set of nodes. Each node has a certain value to the attacker…

In this paper, we study an irreversible investment problem under Knightian uncertainty. In a general framework, in which Knightian uncertainty is modeled through a set of multiple priors, we prove existence and uniqueness of the optimal…

This paper studies sequential quantum games under the assumption that the moves of the players are drawn from groups and not just plain sets. The extra group structure makes possible to easily derive some very general results characterizing…

In this paper we introduce the novel framework of distributionally robust games. These are multi-player games where each player models the state of nature using a worst-case distribution, also called adversarial distribution. Thus each…

In many game-theoretic settings, agents are challenged with taking decisions against the uncertain behavior exhibited by others. Often, this uncertainty arises from multiple sources, e.g., incomplete information, limited computation,…

The purpose of this work is to introduce a notion of weak solution to the master equation of a potential mean field game and to prove that existence and uniqueness hold under quite general assumptions. Remarkably, this is achieved without…

This paper introduces the independent choice logic, and in particular the "single agent with nature" instance of the independent choice logic, namely ICLdt. This is a logical framework for decision making uncertainty that extends both logic…

We study rational agents with different perception capabilities in strategic games. We focus on a class of one-shot limited-perception games. These games extend simultaneous-move normal-form games by presenting each player with an…

Learning models do not in general imply that weakly dominated strategies are irrelevant or justify the related concept of "forward induction," because rational agents may use dominated strategies as experiments to learn how opponents play,…

We extend recent analyses of stochastic effects in game dynamical learning to cases of multi-player games, and to games defined on networked structures. By means of an expansion in the noise strength we consider the weak-noise limit, and…