相关论文: False-Name Manipulations in Weighted Voting Games

Inspired by socio-political scenarios, like dictatorships, in which a minority of people exercise control over a majority of weakly interconnected individuals, we propose vulnerability and power measures defined on groups of actors of…

In this work, we proposed a new $N$-person game in which the players can bet on two options, for example represented by two boxers. Some of the players have privileged information about the boxers and part of them can provide this…

We study discrete preference games in heterogeneous social networks. These games model the interplay between a player's private belief and his/her publicly stated opinion (which could be different from the player's belief) as a strategic…

A mathematical analysis of the distribution of voting power in the Council of the European Union operating according to the Treaty of Lisbon is presented. We study the effects of Brexit on the voting power of the remaining members, measured…

We study agents competing against each other in a repeated network zero-sum game while applying the multiplicative weights update (MWU) algorithm with fixed learning rates. In our implementation, agents select their strategies…

One unexamined assumption in foreign ownership regulation is the notion that majority voting rights translate to 'effective control'. This assumption is so deeply entrenched in foreign investments law that possession of majority voting…

In this dissertation, we analyze the computational properties of game-theoretic centrality measures. The key idea behind game-theoretic approach to network analysis is to treat nodes as players in a cooperative game, where the value of each…

The Shapley value is the prevalent solution for fair division problems in which a payout is to be divided among multiple agents. By adopting a game-theoretic view, the idea of fair division and the Shapley value can also be used in machine…

We study a cooperative game setting where the grand coalition may change since the initial players can invite more players. We focus on monotone games, i.e., adding more players to the grand coalition is not harmful. We model the invitation…

We introduce a new approach to the study of influence in strategic settings where the action of an individual depends on that of others in a network-structured way. We propose \emph{influence games} as a \emph{game-theoretic} model of the…

Consider a two-player game repeated N times. Player 1 can choose between two styles (for interpretability, offensive and defensive), whereas Player 2 uses a single fixed style. Let X N\,:= \#wins -\#losses for Player 1 after N games, and…

We consider voting rules in settings where voters' identities are difficult to verify. Voters can manipulate the process by casting multiple votes under different identities or abstaining from voting. Immunities to such manipulations are…

In shift bribery, a briber seeks to promote his preferred candidate by paying voters to raise their ranking. Classical models of shift bribery assume voters act independently, overlooking the role of social influence. However, in reality,…

This work deals with the power allocation problem in a multipoint-to-multipoint network, which is heterogenous in the sense that each transmit and receiver pair can arbitrarily choose whether to selfishly maximize its own rate or energy…

Feature attribution methods have become essential for explaining machine learning models. Many popular approaches, such as SHAP and Banzhaf values, are grounded in power indices from cooperative game theory, which measure the contribution…

In traditional, one-vote-per-person voting systems, privacy equates with ballot secrecy: voting tallies are published, but individual voters' choices are concealed. Voting systems that weight votes in proportion to token holdings, though,…

A proposal in a weighted voting game is accepted if the sum of the (non-negative) weights of the "yea" voters is at least as large as a given quota. Several authors have considered representations of weighted voting games with minimum sum,…

Various social dilemma games that follow different strategy updating rules have been studied on many networks.The reported results span the entire spectrum, from significantly boosting,to marginally affecting,to seriously decreasing the…

Elections employ various voting systems to determine winners based on voters' preferences. However, many recent ranked-choice elections have forced voters to truncate their ballots by only ranking a subset of the candidates. This study…

We discuss and solve a model for a game with many players, where a subset of truely deciding players is embedded into a hierarchy of dependent agents. These interdependencies modify the game matrix and the Nash equilibria for the deciding…