相关论文: Aggregate Preferred Correspondence and the Existen…
We study a continuous time economy where agents have asymmetric information. The informed agent (``$I$''), at time zero, receives a private signal about the risky assets' terminal payoff $\Psi(X_T)$, while the uninformed agent (``$U$'') has…
We define the model of an abstract economy with private information and a countable set of actions. We generalize the H. Yu and Z. Zhang's model (2007), considering that each agent is characterised by a preference correspondence instead of…
We construct a model of an exchange economy in which agents trade assets contingent on an observable signal, the probability of which depends on public opinion. The agents in our model are replaced occasionally and each person updates…
This paper investigates the ex-post core and its relationships to the fine core and the set of rational expectations equilibrium allocations in an oligopolistic economy with asymmetric information, in which the set of agents consists of…
Public availability of Artificial Intelligence generated information can change the markets forever, and its factoring into economical dynamics may take economists by surprise, out-dating models and schools of thought. Real estate…
New fairness notions aligned with the merit principle are proposed for designing exchange rules. We show that for an obviously strategy-proof, efficient and individually rational rule, (i) an agent receives her favorite object when others…
The problem of allocating scarce items to individuals is an important practical question in market design. An increasingly popular set of mechanisms for this task uses the concept of market equilibrium: individuals report their preferences,…
This paper focuses on a new model to reach the existence of equilibrium in a pure exchange economy with fuzzy preferences (PXE-FP). The proposed model integrates exchange, consumption and the agent's fuzzy preference in the consumption set.…
A generalized continuous economic model is proposed for random markets. In this model, agents interact by pairs and exchange their money in a random way. A parameter controls the effectiveness of the transactions between the agents. We show…
I develop a revealed preference framework to test whether an aggregate allocation of indivisible objects satisfies Pareto efficiency and individual rationality (PI) without observing individual preferences. Exploiting the type-based…
We provide an axiomatic foundation for the representation of num\'{e}raire-invariant preferences of economic agents acting in a financial market. In a static environment, the simple axioms turn out to be equivalent to the following choice…
We study a pure-exchange incomplete-market economy with heterogeneous agents. In each period, the agents choose how much to save (i.e., invest in a risk-free bond), how much to consume, and which bundle of goods to consume while their…
Since economic mechanisms are often applied to very different instances of the same problem, it is desirable to identify mechanisms that work well in a wide range of circumstances. We pursue this goal for a position auction setting and…
Results from the communication complexity literature have demonstrated that stable matching requires communication: one cannot find or verify a stable match without having access to essentially all of the ordinal preference information held…
We represent an exchange economy in terms of statistical ensembles for complex networks by introducing the concept of market configuration. This is defined as a sequence of nonnegative discrete random variables $\{w_{ij}\}$ describing the…
A community of agents is subject to a stream of messages, which are represented as points on a plane of issues. Messages are sent by media and by agents themselves. Messages from media shape the public opinion. They are unbiased, i.e.…
We study finite-state communication games in which the sender's preference is perturbed by random private idiosyncrasies. Persuasion is generically impossible within the class of statistically independent sender/receiver preferences --…
The minimum error entropy (MEE) criterion has been successfully used in fields such as parameter estimation, system identification and the supervised machine learning. There is in general no explicit expression for the optimal MEE estimate…
Consider the set of probability measures with given marginal distributions on the product of two complete, separable metric spaces, seen as a correspondence when the marginal distributions vary. In problems of optimal transport, continuity…
This paper characterizes equilibrium properties of a broad class of economic models that allow multiple heterogeneous agents to interact in heterogeneous manners across several markets. Our key contribution is a new theorem providing…