相关论文: The Biased Sampling Profit Extraction Auction

In this paper, we show a tight approximation guarantee for budget-feasible mechanisms with an additive buyer. We propose a new simple randomized mechanism with approximation ratio of $2$, improving the previous best known result of $3$. Our…

Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenue is an intricate task. The single-item case was resolved in a seminal piece of work by Myerson in 1981, but more than 40 years later a full analytical understanding of…

On markets with receding prices, artificial noise traders may consider alternatives to buy-and-hold. By simulating variations of the Parrondo strategy, using real data from the Swedish stock market, we produce first indications of a…

We revisit the well-studied problem of budget-feasible procurement, where a buyer with a strict budget constraint seeks to acquire services from a group of strategic providers (the sellers). During the last decade, several strategyproof…

We study the problem of multi-dimensional revenue maximization when selling $m$ items to a buyer that has additive valuations for them, drawn from a (possibly correlated) prior distribution. Unlike traditional Bayesian auction design, we…

The E-commerce advertising platforms typically sell commercial traffic through either second-price auction (SPA) or first-price auction (FPA). SPA was historically prevalent due to its dominant strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC) for…

The Empirical Revenue Maximization (ERM) is one of the most important price learning algorithms in auction design: as the literature shows it can learn approximately optimal reserve prices for revenue-maximizing auctioneers in both repeated…

Pricing is an important issue in mobile edge computing. How to appropriately determine the bid of end user (EU) is an incentive factor for edge cloud (EC) to offer service. In this letter, we propose an equilibrium pricing scheme based on…

Myerson's seminal characterization of the revenue-optimal auction for a single item \cite{myerson1981optimal} remains a cornerstone of mechanism design. However, generalizing this framework to multi-item settings has proven exceptionally…

This note describes an algorithm for enumerating all the elements in a finite set based on uniformly random sampling from the set. This algorithm can be used for enumeration by fair sampling with quantum annealing. Our algorithm is based on…

A single unit of a good is sold to one of two bidders. Each bidder has either a high prior valuation or a low prior valuation for the good. Their prior valuations are independently and identically distributed. Each bidder may observe an…

We study buyer-optimal procurement mechanisms when quality is contractible. When some costs are borne by every participant of a procurement auction regardless of winning, the classic analysis should be amended. We show that an optimal…

We comment on two randomized algorithms for constructing low-rank matrix decompositions. Both algorithms employ the Subsampled Randomized Hadamard Transform [14]. The first algorithm appeared recently in [9]; here, we provide a novel…

Multi-unit auctions are a paradigmatic model, where a seller brings multiple units of a good, while several buyers bring monetary endowments. It is well known that Walrasian equilibria do not always exist in this model, however compelling…

We provide simple and approximately revenue-optimal mechanisms in the multi-item multi-bidder settings. We unify and improve all previous results, as well as generalize the results to broader cases. In particular, we prove that the better…

Bilateral trade models the task of intermediating between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, willing to trade a good for which they hold private valuations. We study this problem from the perspective of a broker, in a regret…

Conventional bidding strategies for online display ad auction heavily relies on observed performance indicators such as clicks or conversions. A bidding strategy naively pursuing these easily observable metrics, however, fails to optimize…

We address auctions in two-sided markets with budget constraints on buyers, a fundamental setting also crucial for applications such as display advertising. Our goal is to design efficient mechanisms that satisfy dominant strategy incentive…

Online controlled experiments (A/B tests) are fundamental to data-driven decision-making in the digital economy. However, their real-world application is frequently compromised by two critical shortcomings: the use of statistically flawed…

A seller with one unit of a good faces N\geq3 buyers and a single competitor who sells one other identical unit in a second-price auction with a reserve price. Buyers who do not get the seller's good will compete in the competitor's…