相关论文: Punishment can promote defection in group-structur…
We study the emergence of cooperation in large spatial public goods games. Without employing severe social-pressure against "defectors", or alternatively, significantly rewarding "cooperators", theoretical models typically predict a system…
Taxes are an essential and uniformly applied institution for maintaining modern societies. However, the levels of taxation remain an intensive debate topic among citizens. If each citizen contributes to common goals, a minimal tax would be…
We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games where, besides the classical strategies of cooperation (C) and defection (D), we consider punishing cooperators (PC) or punishing defectors (PD) as an additional strategy.…
Cooperation often depends on individuals avoiding exploitation and interacting preferentially with other cooperators. We explore how context-dependent migration influences the evolution of cooperation in spatially structured populations.…
The emergence and maintenance of cooperative behavior is a fascinating topic in evolutionary biology and social science. The public goods game (PGG) is a paradigm for exploring cooperative behavior. In PGG, the total resulting payoff is…
The public goods game is a famous example illustrating the tragedy of the commons. In this game cooperating individuals contribute to a pool, which in turn is distributed to all members of the group, including defectors who reap the same…
Recent empirical studies suggest that heavy-tailed distributions of human activities are universal in real social dynamics [Muchnik, \emph{et al.}, Sci. Rep. \textbf{3}, 1783 (2013)]. On the other hand, community structure is ubiquitous in…
Theoretical models suggest that social networks influence the evolution of cooperation, but to date there have been few experimental studies. Observational data suggest that a wide variety of behaviors may spread in human social networks,…
Punishment as a mechanism for promoting cooperation has been studied extensively for more than two decades, but its effectiveness remains a matter of dispute. Here, we examine how punishment's impact varies across cooperative settings…
Ecology and evolution are inherently linked, and studying a mathematical model that considers both holds promise of insightful discoveries related to the dynamics of cooperation. In the present article, we use the prisoner's dilemma (PD)…
Monitoring and reporting incorrect acts are pervasive for maintaining human cooperation, but in theory it is unclear how they influence each other. To explore their possible interactions we consider spatially structured population where…
Partner selection is an important process in many social interactions, permitting individuals to decrease the risks associated with cooperation. In large populations, defectors may escape punishment by roving from partner to partner, but…
Leaving the joint enterprise when defection is unveiled is always a viable option to avoid being exploited. Although loner strategy helps the population not to be trapped into the tragedy of the commons state, it could offer only a modest…
Do people discriminate between men and women when they have the option to punish defectors or reward cooperators? Here we report on four pre-registered experiments, that shed some light on this question. Study 1 (N=544) shows that people do…
It has been an old unsolved puzzle to evolutionary theorists on which mechanisms would increase large-scale cooperation in human societies. Thus, how such mechanisms operate in a biological network is still not very understood. This study…
Cooperation in human society is sustained by reputation. In general, the reputation of an individual is determined by others who observe his behavior, but this rarely happens in private situations. This may cause people to behave…
We have studied the evolution of strategies in spatial public goods games where both individual (peer) and institutional (pool) punishments are present beside unconditional defector and cooperator strategies. The evolution of strategy…
Mixed-motive scenarios are ubiquitous in real-world multi-agent interactions, where self-interested agents often defect for immediate rewards, overlooking the potential of altruistic cooperation to improve long-term gains and collective…
The evolution of cooperation often depends upon population structure, yet nearly all models of cooperation implicitly assume that this structure remains static. This is a simplifying assumption, because most organisms possess genetic traits…
Prosocial behaviors are encountered in the donation game, the prisoner's dilemma, relaxed social dilemmas, and public goods games. Many studies assume that the population structure is homogeneous, meaning all individuals have the same…