相关论文: Choosing Products in Social Networks

Under what conditions do the behaviors of players, who play a game repeatedly, converge to a Nash equilibrium? If one assumes that the players' behavior is a discrete-time or continuous-time rule whereby the current mixed strategy profile…

We develop a game-theoretic framework for the study of competition between firms who have budgets to "seed" the initial adoption of their products by consumers located in a social network. The payoffs to the firms are the eventual number of…

We consider games of strategic substitutes and strategic complements on networks. We introduce two different evolutionary dynamics in order to refine their multiplicity of equilibria, and we analyse the system through a mean field approach.…

Strategic interactions between a group of individuals or organisations can be modelled as games played on networks, where a player's payoff depends not only on their actions but also on those of their neighbours. Inferring the network…

We study a network formation game where agents receive benefits by forming connections to other agents but also incur both direct and indirect costs from the formed connections. Specifically, once the agents have purchased their…

Bargaining networks model the behavior of a set of players that need to reach pairwise agreements for making profits. Nash bargaining solutions are special outcomes of such games that are both stable and balanced. Kleinberg and Tardos…

We consider a weighted Shapley network design game, where selfish players choose paths in a network to minimize their cost. The cost function of each edge in the network is affine linear with respect to the sum of weights of the players who…

We provide a unified variational inequality framework for the study of fundamental properties of the Nash equilibrium in network games. We identify several conditions on the underlying network (in terms of spectral norm, infinity norm and…

We address the generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem in a partial-decision information scenario, where each agent can only exchange information with some neighbors, although its cost function possibly depends on the strategies of all…

In this paper we consider the problem of distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking over networks, a setting in which players have limited local information. We start from a continuous-time gradient-play dynamics that converges to an NE…

We study a static game played by a finite number of agents, in which agents are assigned independent and identically distributed random types and each agent minimizes its objective function by choosing from a set of admissible actions that…

We propose a new variant of the strategic classification problem: a principal reveals a classifier, and $n$ agents report their (possibly manipulated) features to be classified. Motivated by real-world applications, our model crucially…

In resource contribution games, a class of non-cooperative games, the players want to obtain a bundle of resources and are endowed with bags of bundles of resources that they can make available into a common for all to enjoy. Available…

This paper studies a strategic model of marketing and product diffusion in social networks. We consider two firms offering substitutable products which can improve their market share by seeding the key individuals in the market. Consumers…

To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…

We consider a repeatedly played generalized Nash equilibrium game. This induces a multi-agent online learning problem with joint constraints. An important challenge in this setting is that the feasible set for each agent depends on the…

Public goods games in undirected networks are generally known to have pure Nash equilibria, which are easy to find. In contrast, we prove that, in directed networks, a broad range of public goods games have intractable equilibrium problems:…

We study Nash equilibria in the network creation game of Fabrikant et al.[10]. In this game a vertex can buy an edge to another vertex for a cost of $\alpha$, and the objective of each vertex is to minimize the sum of the costs of the edges…

This paper studies social interactions in a game theoretic model with players in a large social network. We consider observations from one single equilibrium of a large network game with asymmetric information, in which each player chooses…

We consider a dynamic social network model in which agents play repeated games in pairings determined by a stochastically evolving social network. Individual agents begin to interact at random, with the interactions modeled as games. The…