相关论文: Exchange Economy in Two-User Multiple-Input Single…

Multi-unit auctions are a paradigmatic model, where a seller brings multiple units of a good, while several buyers bring monetary endowments. It is well known that Walrasian equilibria do not always exist in this model, however compelling…

We consider a single buyer with a combinatorial preference that would like to purchase related products and services from different vendors, where each vendor supplies exactly one product. We study the general case where subsets of products…

We consider the problem of decentralized power allocation for competitive rate-maximization in a frequency-selective Gaussian interference channel under bounded channel uncertainty. We formulate a distribution-free robust framework for the…

In this paper, we consider the problem of maximizing the weighted sum energy efficiency (WS-EE) for multi-input single-output (MISO) interference channels (ICs) which is well acknowledged as general models of heterogeneous networks…

The multiple-input multiple-output interference channel is considered with perfect channel information at the transmitters and single-user decoding receivers. With all transmissions restricted to single stream beamforming, we consider the…

We study the problem of market equilibrium (ME) in future wireless networks, with multiple actors competing and negotiating for a pool of heterogeneous resources (communication and computing) while meeting constraints in terms of global…

We consider a network of prosumers involved in peer-to-peer energy exchanges, with differentiation price preferences on the trades with their neighbors, and we analyze two market designs: (i) a centralized market, used as a benchmark, where…

In this work, we apply a common economic tool, namely money, to coordinate network packets. In particular, we present a network economy, called PacketEconomy, where each flow is modeled as a population of rational network packets, and these…

We study market mechanisms for allocating divisible goods to competing agents with quasilinear utilities. For \emph{linear} pricing (i.e., the cost of a good is proportional to the quantity purchased), the First Welfare Theorem states that…

We study algorithms for combinatorial market design problems, where a set of heterogeneous and indivisible objects are priced and sold to potential buyers subject to equilibrium constraints. Extending the CWE notion introduced by Feldman et…

We study the two-user multiple-input single-output (MISO) Gaussian interference channel where the transmitters have perfect channel state information and employ single-stream beamforming. The receivers are capable of performing successive…

We study markets of indivisible items in which price-based (Walrasian) equilibria often do not exist due to the discrete non-convex setting. Instead we consider Nash equilibria of the market viewed as a game, where players bid for items,…

This paper considers the so-called MIMO interference channel. This situation has relevance in applications such as multi-cell coordination in cellular networks as well as spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks among others. We address…

We consider a situation where wireless service providers compete for heterogenous wireless users. The users differ in their willingness to pay as well as in their individual channel gains. We prove existence and uniqueness of the Nash…

In this paper, we consider the problem of maximizing the energy efficiency (EE) for multi-input multi-output (MIMO) interference channels, subject to the per-link power constraint. To avoid extensive information exchange among all links,…

We use valid inequalities (cuts) of the binary integer program for winner determination in a combinatorial auction (CA) as "artificial items" that can be interpreted intuitively and priced to generate Artificial Walrasian Equilibria. We…

We consider a Gaussian interference channel with independent direct and cross link channel gains, each of which is independent and identically distributed across time. Each transmitter-receiver user pair aims to maximize its long-term…

Following the work of Babaioff et al, we consider the pricing game with strategic vendors and a single buyer, modeling a scenario in which multiple competing vendors have very good knowledge of a buyer, as is common in online markets. We…

We revisit the connection between bargaining and equilibrium in exchange economies, and study its algorithmic implications. We consider bargaining outcomes to be allocations that cannot be blocked (i.e., profitably re-traded) by coalitions…

We address the problem of downlink beamforming for mitigating the co-channel interference in multi-cell OFDMA networks. Based on the network utility maximization framework, we formulate the problem as a non-convex optimization problem…