相关论文: ATTac-2000: An Adaptive Autonomous Bidding Agent

Online auctions have expanded rapidly over the last decade and have become a fascinating new type of business or commercial transaction in this digital era. Here we introduce a master equation for the bidding process that takes place in…

We introduce a new matching design for financial transactions in an electronic market. In this mechanism, called ad-hoc electronic auction design (AHEAD), market participants can trade between themselves at a fixed price and trigger an…

Adaptive traffic signal control (ATSC) in urban traffic networks poses a challenging task due to the complicated dynamics arising in traffic systems. In recent years, several approaches based on multi-agent deep reinforcement learning…

Auto-bidding has recently become a popular feature in ad auctions. This feature enables advertisers to simply provide high-level constraints and goals to an automated agent, which optimizes their auction bids on their behalf. In this paper,…

The Amazon Picking Challenge (APC), held alongside the International Conference on Robotics and Automation in May 2015 in Seattle, challenged roboticists from academia and industry to demonstrate fully automated solutions to the problem of…

We consider a variant of the standard Bayesian mechanism, where players evaluate their outcomes and constraints in an ex-ante manner. Such a model captures a major form of modern online advertising where an advertiser is concerned with…

We consider a setting in which bidders participate in multiple auctions run by different sellers, and optimize their bids for the \emph{aggregate} auction. We analyze this setting by formulating a game between sellers, where a seller's…

In this article, we propose a reactive task allocation architecture for a multi-agent system for scenarios where the tasks arrive at random times and are grouped into multiple queues. Two stage tasks are considered where every task has a…

This paper studies a house allocation problem in a networked housing market, where agents can invite others to join the system in order to enrich their options. Top Trading Cycle is a well-known matching mechanism that achieves a set of…

This paper considers an electric vehicle charging scheduling setting where vehicle users can reserve charging time in advance at a charging station. In this setting, users are allowed to explicitly express their preferences over different…

Many auction settings implicitly or explicitly require that bidders are treated equally ex-ante. This may be because discrimination is philosophically or legally impermissible, or because it is practically difficult to implement or…

Motivated by online advertising auctions, we study auction design in repeated auctions played by simple Artificial Intelligence algorithms (Q-learning). We find that first-price auctions with no additional feedback lead to tacit-collusive…

Research on adaptive traffic signal control (ATSC) extends back to at least the 1960s, and many ATSC methods have been proposed over the years. This paper provides a review of this research and proposes a taxonomy for organizing it,…

In 2005 Li et al. gave a phi-competitive deterministic online algorithm for scheduling of packets with agreeable deadlines with a very interesting analysis. This is known to be optimal due to a lower bound by Hajek. We claim that the…

Interactions between agents are usually designed from a global viewpoint. However, the implementation of a multi-agent interaction is distributed. This difference can introduce issues. For instance, it is possible to specify protocols from…

Since its inception in 2016, the Alexa Prize program has enabled hundreds of university students to explore and compete to develop conversational agents through the SocialBot Grand Challenge. The goal of the challenge is to build agents…

We introduce Learning-Augmented Control (LAC), an approach that integrates untrusted machine learning predictions into the control of constrained, nonlinear dynamical systems. LAC is designed to achieve the "best-of-both-worlds" guarantees,…

We study various novel complexity measures for two-sided matching mechanisms, applied to the two canonical strategyproof matching mechanisms, Deferred Acceptance (DA) and Top Trading Cycles (TTC). Our metrics are designed to capture the…

The first-price auction is popular in practice for its simplicity and transparency. Moreover, its potential virtues grow in complex settings where incentive compatible auctions may generate little or no revenue. Unfortunately, the…

Language Model (LM)-based agents remain largely untested in mixed-motive settings where agents must leverage short-term cooperation for long-term competitive goals (e.g., multi-party politics). We introduce Cooperate to Compete (C2C), a…