相关论文: Truthfulness via Proxies

Ads on the Internet are increasingly sold via ad exchanges such as RightMedia, AdECN and Doubleclick Ad Exchange. These exchanges allow real-time bidding, that is, each time the publisher contacts the exchange, the exchange ``calls out'' to…

A classical question of propositional logic is one of the shortest proof of a tautology. A related fundamental problem is to determine the relative efficiency of standard proof systems, where the relative complexity is measured using the…

Budget feasible mechanism design studies procurement combinatorial auctions where the sellers have private costs to produce items, and the buyer(auctioneer) aims to maximize a social valuation function on subsets of items, under the budget…

We give a 3/2-approximation algorithm for stable matchings that runs in $O(m)$ time. The previously best known algorithm by McDermid has the same approximation ratio but runs in $O(n^{3/2}m)$ time, where $n$ denotes the number of people and…

We study truthful mechanisms for hiring a team of agents in three classes of set systems: Vertex Cover auctions, k-flow auctions, and cut auctions. For Vertex Cover auctions, the vertices are owned by selfish and rational agents, and the…

We provide a Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme (PTAS) for the Bayesian optimal multi-item multi-bidder auction problem under two conditions. First, bidders are independent, have additive valuations and are from the same population.…

We study a budget-aggregation setting in which a number of voters report their ideal distribution of a budget over a set of alternatives, and a mechanism aggregates these reports into an allocation. Ideally, such mechanisms are truthful,…

We propose to use orthologic as the basis for designing type systems supporting intersection, union, and negation types in the presence of subtyping assumptions. We show how to extend orthologic to support monotonic and antimonotonic…

Recent work has constructed economic mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private. In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from the truthfulness; it is not incorporated in players' utility functions (and doing so…

The next frontier of online advertising is revenue generation from LLM-generated content. We consider a setting where advertisers aim to influence the responses of an LLM to align with their interests, while platforms seek to maximize…

In this paper, we present the first approximation algorithms for the problem of designing revenue optimal Bayesian incentive compatible auctions when there are multiple (heterogeneous) items and when bidders can have arbitrary demand and…

This paper presents a plausible reasoning system to illustrate some broad issues in knowledge representation: dualities between different reasoning forms, the difficulty of unifying complementary reasoning styles, and the approximate nature…

We introduce and study several notions of approximation for ontology-mediated queries based on the description logics ALC and ALCI. Our approximations are of two kinds: we may (1) replace the ontology with one formulated in a tractable…

We provide a geometric proof that the random proposer mechanism is a $4$-approximation to the first-best gains from trade in bilateral exchange. We then refine this geometric analysis to recover the state-of-the-art approximation ratio of…

Based on M. Hall's theorem we prove a simple result dealing with real numbers which admit exact approximations by rationals.

We introduce proper display calculi for intuitionistic, bi-intuitionistic and classical linear logics with exponentials, which are sound, complete, conservative, and enjoy cut-elimination and subformula property. Based on the same design,…

A central challenge in mechanism design is to develop truthful trade mechanisms that maximize the expected gains-from-trade (GFT) in two-sided markets with strategic agents. As achieving the full GFT is generally impossible, much of the…

Existing auction mechanisms are vulnerable to bidder collusion, which substantially degrades revenue and non-colluder welfare. To design truthful mechanisms resilient to collusion, we introduce a novel approach that leverages a machine…

This paper studies a mechanism design problem over a network, where agents can only participate by referrals. The Bulow-Klemberer theorem proposes that expanding the number of participants is a more effective approach to increase revenue…

In a game of persuasion with evidence, a sender has private information. By presenting evidence on the information, the sender wishes to persuade a receiver to take a single action (e.g., hire a job candidate, or convict a defendant). The…