相关论文: Stability of the bipartite matching model
Many-to-many matching with contracts is studied in the framework of revealed preferences. All preferences are described by choice functions that satisfy natural conditions. Under a no-externality assumption individual preferences can be…
Matching algorithms are used routinely to match donors to recipients for solid organs transplantation, for the assignment of medical residents to hospitals, record linkage in databases, scheduling jobs on machines, network switching, online…
We show that the ratio of matched individuals to blocking pairs grows linearly with the number of propose--accept rounds executed by the Gale--Shapley algorithm for the stable marriage problem. Consequently, the participants can arrive at…
Collaborative machine learning (CML) enables multiple clients to train a global model jointly in a data-distributed setting. To address data privacy and communication efficiency, one-shot CML has been increasingly adopted, where clients…
We introduce a generalized version of the famous Stable Marriage problem, now based on multi-modal preference lists. The central twist herein is to allow each agent to rank its potentially matching counterparts based on more than one…
Social storage systems are becoming increasingly popular compared to the existing data backup systems like local, centralized and P2P systems. An endogenously built symmetric social storage model and its aspects like the utility of each…
To guarantee all agents are matched in general, the classic Deferred Acceptance algorithm needs complete preference lists. In practice, preference lists are short, yet stable matching still works well. This raises two questions: $\bullet$…
We consider design of monetary mechanisms for two-sided matching. Mechanisms in the tradition of the deferred acceptance algorithm, even in variants incorporating money, tend to focus on the criterion of stability. Instead, in this work we…
There has recently been considerable interest in the stability of different fair bandwidth sharing policies for models that arise in the context of Internet congestion control. Here, we consider a connection level model, introduced by…
We study dynamic matching in an infinite-horizon stochastic market. While all agents are potentially compatible with each other, some are hard-to-match and others are easy-to-match. Agents prefer to be matched as soon as possible and…
The maximal matching problem has received considerable attention in the self-stabilizing community. Previous work has given different self-stabilizing algorithms that solves the problem for both the adversarial and fair distributed daemon,…
We study uncoordinated matching markets with additional local constraints that capture, e.g., restricted information, visibility, or externalities in markets. Each agent is a node in a fixed matching network and strives to be matched to…
The assignment game models a housing market where buyers and sellers are matched, and transaction prices are set so that the resulting allocation is stable. Shapley and Shubik showed that every stable allocation is necessarily built on a…
We study the $b$-matching problem in bipartite graphs $G=(S,R,E)$. Each vertex $s\in S$ is a server with individual capacity $b_s$. The vertices $r\in R$ are requests that arrive online and must be assigned instantly to an eligible server.…
A service system with multiple types of customers, arriving according to Poisson processes, is considered. The system is heterogeneous in that the servers also can be of multiple types. Each customer has an independent exponentially…
In the Stable Roommates problem, we seek a stable matching of the agents into pairs, in which no two agents have an incentive to deviate from their assignment. It is well known that a stable matching is unlikely to exist, but a stable…
Queueing systems with a single server in which customers wait to be served at a finite number of distinct locations (buffers/queues) are called discrete polling systems. Polling systems in which arrivals of users occur anywhere in a…
I relate bipartite graph matchings to stable matchings. I prove a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a saturating stable matching, where every agent on one side is matched, for all possible preferences. I extend my…
We thoroughly study a generalized version of the classic Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates problems where agents may share partners. We consider two prominent stability concepts: ordinal stability [Aharoni and Fleiner, Journal of…
An instance of the super-stable matching problem with incomplete lists and ties is an undirected bipartite graph $G = (A \cup B, E)$, with an adjacency list being a linearly ordered list of ties. Ties are subsets of vertices equally good…