相关论文: The norm game - how a norm fails

Mean field Master equations for the norm game are investigated. The strategies are: to obey the norm or not and to punish those who break it or not. The punishment, the temptation, the punishment cost and the relaxation of vengeance are…

The norm game (NG) introduced by Robert Axelrod is a convenient frame to disccuss the time evolution of the level of preserving norms in social systems. Recently NG was formulated in terms of a social contagion on a model social network…

Norms, defined as generally accepted behaviour in societies without central authority (and thus distinguished from laws), are very powerful mechanism leading to coherent behaviour of the society members. This paper examines, within a simple…

Testing by betting has been a cornerstone of the game-theoretic statistics literature. One bets against the null hypothesis, and the accumulated wealth $W_t$ quantifies the evidence against the null hypothesis after $t$ rounds, and the null…

Cooperation played a significant role in the self-organization and evolution of living organisms. Both network topology and the initial position of cooperators heavily affect the cooperation of social dilemma games. We developed a novel…

A social norm defines what is good and what is bad in social contexts, as well as what to do based on such assessments. A stable social norm should be maintained against errors committed by its players. In addition, individuals may have…

The norm game described by Axelrod in 1985 was recently treated with the master equation formalism. Here we discuss the equations, where {\it i)} those who break the norm cannot punish and those who punish cannot break the norm, {\it ii)}…

Human behavioural patterns exhibit selfish or competitive, as well as selfless or altruistic tendencies, both of which have demonstrable effects on human social and economic activity. In behavioural economics, such effects have…

Cooperative behaviour has been extensively studied as a choice between cooperation and defection. However, the possibility to not participate is also frequently available. This type of problem can be studied through the optional public…

Wealthy individuals may be less tempted to defect than those with comparatively low payoffs. To take this into consideration, we introduce coevolutionary success-driven multigames in structured populations. While the core game is always the…

The evolution of cooperation has been a perennial problem in evolutionary biology because cooperation can be undermined by selfish cheaters who gain an advantage in the short run, while compromising the long-term viability of the…

We introduce a new measure of the discrepancy in strategic games between the social welfare in a Nash equilibrium and in a social optimum, that we call selfishness level. It is the smallest fraction of the social welfare that needs to be…

In many cases the Nash equilibria are not predictive of the experimental players' behaviour. For some games of Game Theory it is proposed here a method to estimate the probabilities with which the different options will be actually chosen…

We present a game-theoretic model for the spread of deviant behavior in online social networks. We utilize a two-strategy framework wherein each player's behavior is classified as normal or deviant and evolves according to the…

We consider the coupled dynamics of the adaption of network structure and the evolution of strategies played by individuals occupying the network vertices. We propose a computational model in which each agent plays a $n$-round Prisoner's…

Costly punishment has been suggested as a key mechanism for stabilizing cooperation in one-shot games. However, recent studies have revealed that the effectiveness of costly punishment can be diminished by second-order free riders (i.e.,…

We study a complementarity game with multiple populations whose members' offered contributions are put together towards some common aim. When the sum of the players' offers reaches or exceeds some threshold K, they each receive K minus…

In a social dilemma situation, where individual and collective interests are in conflict, it sounds a reasonable assumption that the presence of super or smart players, who simultaneously punish defection and reward cooperation without…

We introduce an evolutionary game with feedback between perception and reality, which we call the reality game. It is a game of chance in which the probabilities for different objective outcomes (e.g., heads or tails in a coin toss) depend…

We study discounted infinitely repeated games in which players agree on a cooperative mixed action profile but, at each step, observe only the realized pure actions. This form of imperfect monitoring breaks classical trigger strategies,…