相关论文: Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist B…

Control and bribery are settings in which an external agent seeks to influence the outcome of an election. Faliszewski et al. [FHHR07] proved that Llull voting (which is here denoted by Copeland^1) and a variant (here denoted by Copeland^0)…

We study the control complexity of fallback voting. Like manipulation and bribery, electoral control describes ways of changing the outcome of an election; unlike manipulation or bribery attempts, control actions---such as…

A central theme in computational social choice is to study the extent to which voting systems computationally resist manipulative attacks seeking to influence the outcome of elections, such as manipulation (i.e., strategic voting), control,…

Electoral control models ways of changing the outcome of an election via such actions as adding/deleting/partitioning either candidates or voters. These actions modify an election's participation structure and aim at either making a…

Distortion-based analysis has established itself as a fruitful framework for comparing voting mechanisms. m voters and n candidates are jointly embedded in an (unknown) metric space, and the voters submit rankings of candidates by…

Schulze and ranked-pairs elections have received much attention recently, and the former has quickly become a quite widely used election system. For many cases these systems have been proven resistant to bribery, control, or manipulation,…

Electoral control models ways of changing the outcome of an election via such actions as adding/deleting/partitioning either candidates or voters. To protect elections from such control attempts, computational complexity has been…

We study sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting (SP-AV), a system proposed by Brams and Sanver [Electoral Studies, 25(2):287-305, 2006], and here adjusted so as to coerce admissibility of the votes (rather than excluding…

We study the behavior of Range Voting and Normalized Range Voting with respect to electoral control. Electoral control encompasses attempts from an election chair to alter the structure of an election in order to change the outcome. We show…

Electoral control refers to attempts by an election's organizer ("the chair") to influence the outcome by adding/deleting/partitioning voters or candidates. The groundbreaking work of Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92] on (constructive)…

We survey the design of elections that are resilient to attempted interference by third parties. For example, suppose votes have been cast in an election between two candidates, and then each vote is randomly changed with a small…

The utilitarian distortion framework evaluates voting rules by their worst-case efficiency loss when voters have cardinal utilities but express only ordinal rankings. Under the classical model, a longstanding tension exists: Plurality,…

Lu and Boutilier proposed a novel approach based on "minimax regret" to use classical score based voting rules in the setting where preferences can be any partial (instead of complete) orders over the set of alternatives. We show here that…

We study the robustness of approval-based participatory budgeting (PB) rules to random noise in the votes. Our contributions are twofold. First, we study the computational complexity of the #Flip-Bribery problem, where given a PB instance…

One way of evaluating social choice (voting) rules is through a utilitarian distortion framework. In this model, we assume that agents submit full rankings over the alternatives, and these rankings are generated from underlying, but…

In distortion-based analysis of social choice rules over metric spaces, one assumes that all voters and candidates are jointly embedded in a common metric space. Voters rank candidates by non-decreasing distance. The mechanism, receiving…

We study the parameterized control complexity of fallback voting, a voting system that combines preference-based with approval voting. Electoral control is one of many different ways for an external agent to tamper with the outcome of an…

Walsh [Wal10, Wal09], Davies et al. [DKNW10, DKNW11], and Narodytska et al. [NWX11] studied various voting systems empirically and showed that they can often be manipulated effectively, despite their manipulation problems being NP-hard.…

We investigate the parameterized complexity of strategic behaviors in generalized scoring rules. In particular, we prove that the manipulation, control (all the 22 standard types), and bribery problems are fixed-parameter tractable for most…

Maximum likelihood estimation furnishes powerful insights into voting theory, and the design of voting rules. However the MLE can usually be badly corrupted by a single outlying sample. This means that a single voter or a group of colluding…