相关论文: Relative Strength of Strategy Elimination Procedur…

We compare two procedures for the iterated removal of strictly dominated strategies. In the nested procedure, a strategy of a player is removed only if it is dominated by an unremoved strategy. The universal procedure is more comprehensive…

We consider the computational complexity of the question whether a certain strategy can be removed from a game by means of iterated elimination of dominated strategies. In particular, we study the influence of different definitions of…

It is well-known that in finite strategic games true common belief (or common knowledge) of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. We…

A strategy is a plan, method, or series of actions for obtaining a specified goal. A military strategy typically employs the threat or use of military force in opposition to an adversary, and is called upon where large scale force is viewed…

We study the effectiveness of iterated elimination of strictly-dominated actions in random games. We show that dominance solvability of games is vanishingly small as the number of at least one player's actions grows. Furthermore,…

We provide here an epistemic analysis of arbitrary strategic games based on the possibility correspondences. Such an analysis calls for the use of transfinite iterations of the corresponding operators. Our approach is based on Tarski's…

Repeated games are difficult to analyze, especially when agents play mixed strategies. We study one-memory strategies in iterated prisoner's dilemma, then generalize the result to k-memory strategies in repeated games. Our result shows that…

Strategy iteration is a technique frequently used for two-player games in order to determine the winner or compute payoffs, but to the best of our knowledge no general framework for strategy iteration has been considered. Inspired by…

Usually, to apply game-theoretic methods, we must specify utilities precisely, and we run the risk that the solutions we compute are not robust to errors in this specification. Ordinal games provide an attractive alternative: they require…

In the context of strategic games, we provide an axiomatic proof of the statement Common knowledge of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.…

Matrix games constitute a fundamental problem of game theory and describe a situation of two players with completely conflicting interests. We show how methods from statistical mechanics can be used to investigate the statistical properties…

Recently, in [K.R. Apt and S. Simon: Well-founded extensive games with perfect information, TARK21], we studied well-founded games, a natural extension of finite extensive games with perfect information in which all plays are finite. We…

We consider solutions of normal form games that are invariant under strategic equivalence. We consider additional properties that can be expected (or be desired) from a solution of a game, and we observe the following: - Even the weakest…

We consider a game in which the action set of each player is uncountable, and show that, from weak assumptions on the common prior, any mixed strategy has an approximately equivalent pure strategy. The assumption of this result can be…

Our objective in this paper is to develop a machinery that makes a given organizational strategic plan resilient to the actions of competitor agents (adverse environmental actions). We assume that we are given a goal tree representing…

We show on a 4x4 example that many dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibria, and this for an open set of games. This holds for the best-response dynamics, the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics and any monotonic or…

We study the conditions under which the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies is order independent and we identify a class of discontinuous games for which order does not matter. In this way, we answer the open problem…

We provide elementary and uniform proofs of order independence for various strategy elimination procedures for finite strategic games, both for dominance by pure and by mixed strategies. The proofs follow the same pattern and focus on the…

Two natural strategy elimination procedures have been studied for strategic games. The first one involves the notion of (strict, weak, etc) dominance and the second the notion of rationalizability. In the case of dominance the criterion of…

A checkers-like model game with a simplified set of rules is studied through extensive simulations of agents with different expertise and strategies. The introduction of complementary strategies, in a quite general way, provides a tool to…