理论经济学
When does consulting one information source raise the value of another, and when does it diminish it? We study this question for Bayesian decision-makers facing finite actions. The interaction decomposes into two opposing forces: a…
In this paper, we study aggregation rules with nontrivial symmetric classes of invariant sets (restricted domains), assuming that they, unlike others, have a logical nature. In the simplest case, we provide a complete classification of such…
A researcher wants to ask a decision-maker about a belief related to a choice the decision-maker made; examples include eliciting confidence or cognitive uncertainty. When can the researcher provide incentives for the decision-maker to…
Standard procurement models assume that the buyer knows the quality of the good at the time of procurement; however, in many settings, the quality is learned only long after the transaction. We study procurement problems in which the…
We conduct an incentivized laboratory experiment to study people's perception of generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) alignment in the context of economic decision-making. Using a panel of economic problems spanning the domains of…
This paper studies the economic role of persistent dispersion in allocations across agents. We develop a tractable model in which firms allocate resources under imperfect information and behavioral updating, generating sustained…
This paper examines the optimal contracts in a two-dimensional screening model where one dimension(group identity) is verifiable by agents but not falsifiable. A principal offers contracts to agents who differ in cost types and group…
This paper studies how uncertainty about problem difficulty shapes problem-solving strategies. I develop a dynamic model where an agent solves a problem by brainstorming approaches of unknown quality and allocating a fixed effort budget…
We present a model of a forecaster who must predict the future value of a variable that depends on an exogenous state and on the intervention of a policy-maker. We investigate the incentives of the forecaster to acquire costly private…
This article demonstrates how a large number of efficiency measures known in the literature in production economics can be interpreted through the notion of utility function, based on the concept of Stone-Geary utility. Several…
Industrial policy has returned to the centre of economic governance, particularly in the high-tech sectors where positive network externalities in demand make market dominance self-reinforcing. This paper studies the welfare effects of an…
Human decision makers increasingly delegate choices to AI agents, raising a natural question: does the AI implement the human principal's preferences or pursue its own? To study this question using revealed preference techniques, I…
In many applications of cooperative game theory -- from corporate governance and cartel formation to parliamentary voting -- not all winning coalitions are feasible. Ideological distances, institutional constraints, or pre-electoral…
We develop an axiomatic framework to evaluate income distributions from the perspective of an opportunity-egalitarian social planner. Building on a formal link with the literature on decision theory under ambiguity, we characterize a class…
We study $n$-dimensional contests between two players with heterogeneous effort costs, where each dimension (battle) is modeled as a Tullock contest. Prize-allocation rules are identity-independent, budget-balanced, and weakly increasing in…
Medical "Crisis Standards of Care" call for a utilitarian allocation of scarce resources in emergencies, while favoring the worst-off under normal conditions. Inspired by such triage rules, we introduce social welfare functions whose…
We investigate preference domains under which every unanimous and locally strategy-proof social choice function (scf) satisfies dictatorship. We identify a condition on domains called connected with distinct neighbours which is necessary…
A sender communicates private information about a hidden state to a receiver who seeks to match his action to that state. The sender strives to appear informed at the receiver's expense. I characterize informative equilibria under a broad…
How do incentive levels affect strategic behaviour? We address this with an experiment that separately identifies own- and opponent-incentive effects in two dominance-solvable games that differ in strategic complexity. Higher own incentives…
We develop a Euclidean path-integral control to characterize optimal firm behavior in an economy governed by Walrasian equilibrium, Pareto efficiency, and non-cooperative Markovian feedback Nash equilibrium. The approach recasts the problem…