理论经济学
Consumers discover their preferences through experience, yet the sequence and composition of those experiences are often designed by firms, digital platforms, or policymakers. We introduce a ``data-design'' framework for preference…
We extend Kuhn's Theorem to games of the extensive form with unawareness. We prove that if a game of the extensive form with unawareness has perfect recall, then for each mixed strategy there is an equivalent behavior strategy. We show that…
A policymaker often wants to steer a decision-maker toward one of two actions, but lacks reliable knowledge of how the decision-maker perceives uncertainty or evaluates risk. We formalize a notion of robust paternalism: a modification a' of…
We analyze how firms should design wage contracts when workers collaborate in teams and effort costs depend on colleagues through a peer network. Performance-based compensation generates incentives that cascade through the organization,…
We study the design of an auction for an income-generating asset such as an intellectual property license. Each bidder has a signal about his future income from acquiring the asset. After the asset is allocated, the winner's income from the…
An updating rule specifies how an agent reacts to information. An updating rule is Blackwell monotone if more information is always better for an agent in a decision problem and strictly Blackwell monotone if, in addition, there is always a…
We study what changes to an agent's decision problem increase her value for information. We prove that information becomes more valuable if and only if the agent's reduced-form payoff in her belief becomes more convex. When the…
For networks with externalities, where each component's worth may depend on the full network structure, balanced contributions and fairness lead to distinct component-efficient allocation rules. We characterize the unique…
Standard ordinal allocation methods ignore how strongly agents value different improvements, while cardinal methods require additional assumptions that are often considered too demanding. This paper studies assignment problems in the middle…
Many matching markets feature unknown, dynamic arrivals of agents that must match immediately. A caseworker must match an abused child to a foster home, a hospital must assign a patient in critical condition to a room, or a city must place…
This paper bridges social security design and general equilibrium theory to conceive optimally balanced pay-as-you-go systems. The design is based on the backward calculation algorithm from Dognini (2025), which is used to find optimal…
In experimental applications of bounded-reasoning models, behavior is often summarized by distributions of "levels". We argue that such summaries conflate two conceptually distinct dimensions: a player's type, capturing beliefs about what…
We study a linear statistical model where outcomes depend on regressors with fixed population coefficients and observation-specific latent coefficients, along with measurement errors. A decision-maker estimates population coefficients and…
McGranaghan, Nielsen, O'Donoghue, Somerville, and Sprenger [2024] show that standard paired choice tests for the common ratio effect are structurally biased when choice is stochastic, proposing valuation tests as a robust alternative. Using…
We model a competitive market where AI agents buy answers from upstream generative models and resell them to users who differ in how much they value accuracy and in how much they fear hallucinations. Agents can privately exert effort for…
Regimes routinely conceal acts of repression. We show that observed repression may be negatively correlated with total repression, consisting of both revealed and concealed acts. This distortion can generate perverse effects for policy…
The St. Petersburg paradox presents a longstanding challenge in decision theory: its classical expected value diverges, yet no correspondingly large finite stake is typically regarded as rational. Traditional responses introduce auxiliary…
A Ranked candidate voting method based on Phragmen's procedure is described that can be used to produce a top-down proportional candidate list. The method complies with the Droop proportionality criterion satisfied by Single Transferable…
We study balanced exchange problems in which agents with responsive preferences are endowed with multiple indivisible objects and can trade without transfers (e.g. shift exchange, time-banking). Eliciting full preferences over bundles is…
We show that in Greenberg (1989)'s coalitional repeated game situation, every nondiscriminating Conservative Stable Standard of Behavior is a subset of the set of Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium (Ali and Liu 2026) paths. Moreover, the set…