理论经济学

This paper generalizes the concept of Bayes correlated equilibrium (Bergemann and Morris, 2016) to multi-stage games. We demonstrate the power of our characterization results by applying them to a number of illustrative examples and…

The guarantee of an anonymous mechanism is the worst case welfare an agent can secure against unanimously adversarial others. How high can such a guarantee be, and what type of mechanism achieves it? We address the worst case design…

This paper extends the sequential search model of Wolinsky (1986) by allowing firms to choose how much match value information to disclose to visiting consumers. This restores the Diamond paradox (Diamond 1971): there exist no symmetric…

We study interactions with uncertainty about demand sensitivity. In our solution concept (1) firms choose seemingly-optimal strategies given the level of sophistication of their data analytics, and (2) the levels of sophistication form best…

A patient player privately observes a persistent state that directly affects his myopic opponents' payoffs, and can be one of the several commitment types that plays the same mixed action in every period. I characterize the set of…

We study the experimentation dynamics of a decision maker (DM) in a two-armed bandit setup (Bolton and Harris (1999)), where the agent holds ambiguous beliefs regarding the distribution of the return process of one arm and is certain about…

Economic theory has provided an estimable intuition in understanding the perplexing ideologies in law, in the areas of economic law, tort law, contract law, procedural law and many others. Most legal systems require the parties involved in…

We investigate the formation of Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in a competing importers framework with $n$ countries. We show that (i) FTA formation causes a negative externality to non-participants, (ii) a non-participant is willing to join an…

This paper identifies the mathematical equivalence between economic networks of Cobb-Douglas agents and Artificial Neural Networks. It explores two implications of this equivalence under general conditions. First, a burgeoning literature…

This paper develops a framework for repeated matching markets. The model departs from the Gale-Shapley matching model by having a fixed set of long-lived hospitals match with a new generation of short-lived residents in every period. I show…

We present a directed variant of Salop (1979) model to analyze bus transport dynamics. The players are operators competing in cooperative and non-cooperative games. Utility, like in most bus concession schemes in emerging countries, is…

A sender sells an object of unknown quality to a receiver who pays his expected value for it. Sender and receiver might hold different priors over quality. The sender commits to a monotonic categorization of quality. We characterize the…

Along with the energy transition, the energy markets change their organization toward more decentralized and self-organized structures, striving for locally optimal profits. These tendencies may endanger the physical grid stability. One…

We study a pure-exchange incomplete-market economy with heterogeneous agents. In each period, the agents choose how much to save (i.e., invest in a risk-free bond), how much to consume, and which bundle of goods to consume while their…

The idea of this paper comes from the famous remark of Piketty and Zuckman: "It is natural to imagine that $\sigma$ was much less than one in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and became larger than one in the twentieth and…

Faced with huge market potential and increasing competition in emerging industries, product manufacturers with key technologies tend to consider whether to implement a component open supply strategy. This study focuses on a pricing game…

Omnichannel retailing, a new form of distribution system, seamlessly integrates the Internet and physical stores. This study considers the pricing and fulfillment strategies of a retailer that has two sales channels: online and one physical…

This paper studies the relationship between core and competitive equilibira in economies that consist of a continuum of agents and some large agents. We construct a class of these economies in which the core and competitive allocations do…

The motivation of this note is to show how singular values affect local uniqueness. More precisely, Theorem 3.1 shows how to construct a neighborhood (a ball) of a regular equilibrium whose diameter represents an estimate of local…

This paper studies the provision of incentives for information acquisition. Information is costly for an agent to acquire and unobservable to a principal. We show that any Pareto optimal contract has a decomposition into a fraction of…