计算机科学与博弈论

We study automated security response for an IT infrastructure and formulate the interaction between an attacker and a defender as a partially observed, non-stationary game. We relax the standard assumption that the game model is correctly…

This study explores the application of Quadratic Voting (QV) and its generalization to improve decentralization and effectiveness in blockchain governance systems. The conducted research identified three main types of quadratic (square…

An open problem in linear quadratic (LQ) games has been characterizing the Nash equilibria. This problem has renewed relevance given the surge of work on understanding the convergence of learning algorithms in dynamic games. This paper…

We investigate the fair allocation of indivisible goods to agents with possibly different entitlements represented by weights. Previous work has shown that guarantees for additive valuations with existing envy-based notions cannot be…

Natural and political disasters, including earthquakes, hurricanes, and tsunamis, but also migration and refugees crisis, need quick and coordinated responses in order to support vulnerable populations. In such disasters, nongovernmental…

The shortest-time route recommendations offered by modern navigation systems fuel selfish routing in urban vehicular traffic networks and are therefore one of the main reasons for the growth of congestion. In contrast, intelligent…

We propose a new fairness notion, motivated by the practical challenge of allocating teaching assistants (TAs) to courses in a department. Each course requires a certain number of TAs and each TA has preferences over the courses they want…

We consider online procurement auctions, where the agents arrive sequentially, in random order, and have private costs for their services. The buyer aims to maximize a monotone submodular value function for the subset of agents whose…

We investigate the equilibrium stability and robustness in a class of moving target defense problems, in which players have both incomplete information and asymmetric cognition. We first establish a Bayesian Stackelberg game model for…

This paper introduces a game-theoretic model tailored for reward distribution on crowd-sourced computing platforms. It explores a repeated game framework where miners, as computation providers, decide their computation power contribution in…

We study social learning dynamics motivated by reviews on online platforms. The agents collectively follow a simple multi-armed bandit protocol, but each agent acts myopically, without regards to exploration. We allow the greedy…

Feedback Nash equilibrium strategies in multi-agent dynamic games require availability of all players' state information to compute control actions. However, in real-world scenarios, sensing and communication limitations between agents make…

Individuals often aim to reverse undesired outcomes in interactions with automated systems, like loan denials, by either implementing system-recommended actions (recourse), or manipulating their features. While providing recourse benefits…

We introduce and study pawn games, a class of two-player zero-sum turn-based graph games. A turn-based graph game proceeds by placing a token on an initial vertex, and whoever controls the vertex on which the token is located, chooses its…

Learning in games has emerged as a powerful tool for machine learning with numerous applications. Quantum games model interactions between strategic players who have access to quantum resources, and several recent works have studied…

Blockchain systems, such as Ethereum, are increasingly adopting layer-2 scaling solutions to improve transaction throughput and reduce fees. One popular layer-2 approach is the Optimistic Rollup, which relies on a mechanism known as a…

Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) is a popular and important fairness property in the fair allocation of indivisible goods, of which its existence in general is still an open question. In this work, we investigate the problem of…

Two-sided matching markets, environments in which two disjoint groups of agents seek to partner with one another, arise in several contexts. In static, centralized markets where agents know their preferences, standard algorithms can yield a…

In simple games, larger coalitions typically wield more power, but do all players align their efforts effectively? Consider a voting scenario where a coalition forms, but needs more voters to pass a bill. The cohesion of the new group of…

We study the problem of position allocation in job marketplaces, where the platform determines the ranking of the jobs for each seeker. The design of ranking mechanisms is critical to marketplace efficiency, as it influences both short-term…