计算机科学与博弈论

Participation incentives is a well-known issue inhibiting randomized controlled trials (RCTs) in medicine, as well as a potential cause of user dissatisfaction for RCTs in online platforms. We frame this issue as a non-standard…

We present a novel framework for analyzing blockchain consensus mechanisms by modeling blockchain growth as a Partially Observable Stochastic Game (POSG) which we reduce to a set of Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs)…

Modern commercial ground vehicles are increasingly equipped with multiple operational modalities (e.g., human driving, advanced driver assistance, remote tele-operation, full autonomy). These often rely on heterogeneous sensing…

Probabilistic Coalition Structure Generation (PCSG) is NP-hard and can be recast as an $l_0$-type sparse recovery problem by representing coalition structures as sparse coefficient vectors over a coalition-incidence design. A natural…

Mechanism design is pivotal to federated learning (FL) for maximizing social welfare by coordinating self-interested clients. Existing mechanisms, however, often overlook the network effects of client participation and the diverse model…

Ethereum's upcoming Glamsterdam upgrade introduces EIP-7732 enshrined Proposer--Builder Separation (ePBS), which improves the block production pipeline by addressing trust and scalability challenges. Yet it also creates a new liveness risk:…

In the setup of selling one or more goods, various papers have shown, in various forms and for various purposes, that a small change in the distribution of a buyer's valuations may cause only a small change in the possible revenue that can…

We study the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. We focus on envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) -- an important fairness notion in fair division of indivisible goods. A…

We consider turn-based stochastic two-player games with a combination of a parity condition that must hold surely, that is in all possible outcomes, and of a parity condition that must hold almost-surely, that is with probability 1. The…

The housing market, also known as one-sided matching market, is a classic exchange economy model where each agent on the demand side initially owns an indivisible good (a house) and has a personal preference over all goods. The goal is to…

Noncooperative multi-agent systems often face coordination challenges due to conflicting preferences among agents. In particular, when agents act in their own self-interest, they may prefer different choices among multiple feasible…

We provide an elementary proof that revenue-maximizing mechanisms exist in multi-parameter settings whenever the distribution of valuations has finite expectation.

We investigate optimal social welfare allocations of $m$ items to $n$ agents with binary additive or submodular valuations. For binary additive valuations, we prove that the set of optimal allocations coincides with the set of so-called…

Online bidding serves as a fundamental information system in mobile ecosystems, facilitating real-time ad allocation across billions of devices while optimizing both platform performance and user experience through data-driven decision…

The classic notion of \emph{truthfulness} requires that no agent has a profitable manipulation -- an untruthful report that, for \emph{some} combination of reports of the other agents, increases her utility. This strong notion implicitly…

We consider the participatory budgeting problem where each of $n$ voters specifies additive utilities over $m$ candidate projects with given sizes, and the goal is to choose a subset of projects (i.e., a committee) with total size at most…

In voting with ranked ballots, each agent submits a strict ranking of the form $a \succ b \succ c \succ d$ over the alternatives, and the voting rule decides on the winner based on these rankings. Although this ballot format has desirable…

The purpose of Carroll Mechanisms is to facilitate autonomous group sensemaking and reasoned decisionmaking by incentivizing participants to be transparent about their reasoning process, and to empower participants who are known to be…

We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to couples, where each couple consists of two agents with distinct additive valuations. We show that there exist instances of allocating indivisible items to $n$ couples for…

For solving zero-sum games involving non-transitivity, a useful approach is to maintain a policy population to approximate the Nash Equilibrium (NE). Previous studies have shown that the Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO) algorithm is an…