计算机科学与博弈论

In computational social choice, the distortion of a voting rule quantifies the degree to which the rule overcomes limited preference information to select a socially desirable outcome. This concept has been investigated extensively, but…

Social dilemmas are situations in which collective welfare is at odds with individual gain. One widely studied example, due to the conflict it poses between human behaviour and game theoretic reasoning, is the Traveler's Dilemma. The…

In a two-round auction, a subset of bidders is selected (probabilistically), according to their bids in the first round, for the second round, where they can increase their bids. We formalize the two-round auction model, restricting the…

We study a planner's provision of information to manage workplace occupancy when strategic workers (agents) face risk of infectious disease transmission. The planner implements an information mechanism to signal information about the…

By allowing users to erase their data's impact on federated learning models, federated unlearning protects users' right to be forgotten and data privacy. Despite a burgeoning body of research on federated unlearning's technical feasibility,…

We study online learning and equilibrium computation in games with polyhedral decision sets, a property shared by both normal-form games and extensive-form games (EFGs), when the learning agent is restricted to using a best-response oracle.…

Stackelberg games originate where there are market leaders and followers, and the actions of leaders influence the behavior of the followers. Mathematical modelling of such games results in what's called a Bilevel Optimization problem.…

Many interactions result in a socially suboptimal equilibrium, or in a non-equilibrium state, from which arriving at an equilibrium through simple dynamics can be impossible of too long. Aiming to achieve a certain equilibrium, we persuade,…

For multi-transmission rate environments, access point (AP) connection methods have been proposed for maximizing system throughput, which is the throughput of an entire system, on the basis of the cooperative behavior of users. These…

Recent advancements in algorithms for sequential decision-making under imperfect information have shown remarkable success in large games such as limit- and no-limit poker. These algorithms traditionally formalize the games using the…

We study game-theoretic models for capturing participation in blockchain systems. Permissionless blockchains can be naturally viewed as games, where a set of potentially interested users is faced with the dilemma of whether to engage with…

We broaden the basis of non-cooperative game theory by considering miscoordination on a solution concept. For any solution concept, we extend the solution set of a strategic-form game to a transition set. This set contains profiles where…

We consider the problem of fair division, where a set of indivisible goods should be distributed fairly among a set of agents with combinatorial valuations. To capture fairness, we adopt the notion of shares, where each agent is entitled to…

We study a subclass of $n$-player stochastic games, namely, stochastic games with independent chains and unknown transition matrices. In this class of games, players control their own internal Markov chains whose transitions do not depend…

Consider spies infiltrating a network or dissidents secretly organising under a dictatorship. Such scenarios can be cast as adversarial social network analysis problems involving nodes connecting while evading network analysis tools, e.g.,…

We introduce a general technique for proving membership of search problems with exact rational solutions in PPAD, one of the most well-known classes containing total search problems with polynomial-time verifiable solutions. In particular,…

To protect users' right to be forgotten in federated learning, federated unlearning aims at eliminating the impact of leaving users' data on the global learned model. The current research in federated unlearning mainly concentrated on…

We show that no efficient ascending auction can guarantee to find even a minimal envy-free price vector if all valuations are submodular, assuming a basic complexity theory's assumption.

We study two combinatorial contract design models -- multi-agent and multi-action -- where a principal delegates the execution of a costly project to others. In both settings, the principal cannot observe the choices of the agent(s), only…

Several different fairness notions have been introduced in the context of fair allocation of goods. In this manuscript, we compare between some fairness notions that are used in settings in which agents have arbitrary (perhaps unequal)…