Trojan Horse attacks on Quantum Key Distribution systems
摘要
General Trojan horse attacks on quantum key distribution systems are analyzed. We illustrate the power of such attacks with today's technology and conclude that all system must implement active counter-measures. In particular all systems must include an auxiliary detector that monitors any incoming light. We show that such counter-measures can be efficient, provided enough additional privacy amplification is applied to the data. We present a practical way to reduce the maximal information gain that an adversary can gain using Trojan horse attacks. This does reduce the security analysis of the 2-way {\it Plug-&-Play} system to those of the standard 1-way systems.
引用
@article{arxiv.quant-ph/0507063,
title = {Trojan Horse attacks on Quantum Key Distribution systems},
author = {N. Gisin and S. Fasel and B. Kraus and H. Zbinden and G. Ribordy},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:quant-ph/0507063},
year = {2013}
}
备注
7 pages; refs added and a new paragraph on the reduction of the security analysis of 2-way quantum cryptography systems to the security of 1-way systems