Related papers: Selfish routing games with priority lanes
In congestion games, selfish users behave myopically to crowd to the shortest paths, and the social planner designs mechanisms to regulate such selfish routing through information or payment incentives. However, such mechanism design…
How do rational agents self-organize when trying to connect to a common target? We study this question with a simple tree formation game which is related to the well-known fair single-source connection game by Anshelevich et al. (FOCS'04)…
The Internet is a loose amalgamation of independent service providers acting in their own self-interest. We examine the implications of this economic reality on peering relationships. Specifically, we consider how the incentives of the…
This paper analyzes the pricing of transit traffic in wireless peer-to-peer networks using the concepts of direct and indirect network externalities. We first establish that without any pricing mechanism, congestion externalities overwhelm…
The congestion pricing is an efficient allocation approach to mediate demand and supply of network resources. Different from the previous pricing using Affine Marginal Cost (AMC), we focus on studying the game between network coding and…
Selfish Network Creation focuses on modeling real world networks from a game-theoretic point of view. One of the classic models by Fabrikant et al. [PODC'03] is the network creation game, where agents correspond to nodes in a network which…
We study the equilibrium behavior in a multi-commodity selfish routing game with many types of uncertain users where each user over- or under-estimates their congestion costs by a multiplicative factor. Surprisingly, we find that…
We study {\em bottleneck congestion games} where the social cost is determined by the worst congestion of any resource. These games directly relate to network routing problems and also job-shop scheduling problems. In typical bottleneck…
In a traffic network, vehicles normally select their routes selfishly. Consequently, traffic networks normally operate at an equilibrium characterized by Wardrop conditions. However, it is well known that equilibria are inefficient in…
We study the performance of approximate Nash equilibria for linear congestion games. We consider how much the price of anarchy worsens and how much the price of stability improves as a function of the approximation factor $\epsilon$. We…
Two important metrics for measuring the quality of routing paths are the maximum edge congestion $C$ and maximum path length $D$. Here, we study bicriteria in routing games where each player $i$ selfishly selects a path that simultaneously…
According to the proportional allocation mechanism from the network optimization literature, users compete for a divisible resource -- such as bandwidth -- by submitting bids. The mechanism allocates to each user a fraction of the resource…
We consider a nonatomic selfish routing model with independent stochastic travel times, represented by mean and variance latency functions for each edge that depend on their flows. In an effort to decouple the effect of risk-averse player…
We investigate the price of anarchy (PoA) in non-atomic congestion games when the total demand $T$ gets very large. First results in this direction have recently been obtained by \cite{Colini2016On, Colini2017WINE, Colini2017arxiv} for…
We consider a resource allocation problem where individual users wish to send data across a network to maximize their utility, and a cost is incurred at each link that depends on the total rate sent through the link. It is known that as…
Traffic congestion has large economic and social costs. The introduction of autonomous vehicles can potentially reduce this congestion, both by increasing network throughput and by enabling a social planner to incentivize users of…
Consider an unobservable $M|G|1$ queue with preemptive-resume scheduling and two priority classes. Customers are strategic and may join the premium class for a fee. We analyze the resulting equilibrium outcomes, equilibrium stability, and…
Uncoordinated individuals in human society pursuing their personally optimal strategies do not always achieve the social optimum, the most beneficial state to the society as a whole. Instead, strategies form Nash equilibria which are often…
We study cost-sharing games in real-time scheduling systems where the activation cost of the server at any given time is a function of its load. We focus on monomial cost functions and consider both the case when the degree is less than one…
Varied real world systems such as transportation networks, supply chains and energy grids present coordination problems where many agents must learn to share resources. It is well known that the independent and selfish interactions of…