Related papers: Selfish routing games with priority lanes

The Internet has emerged as perhaps the most important network in modern computing, but rather miraculously, it was created through the individual actions of a multitude of agents rather than by a central planning authority. This motivates…

We study a routing game in which one of the players unilaterally acts altruistically by taking into consideration the latency cost of other players as well as his own. By not playing selfishly, a player can not only improve the other…

Mobility systems often suffer from a high price of anarchy due to the uncontrolled behavior of selfish users. This may result in societal costs that are significantly higher compared to what could be achieved by a centralized system-optimal…

We generalize the notions of user equilibrium and system optimum to non-atomic congestion games with stochastic demands. We establish upper bounds on the price of anarchy for three different settings of link cost functions and demand…

This paper investigates design of noncooperative games from an optimization and control theoretic perspective. Pricing mechanisms are used as a design tool to ensure that the Nash equilibrium of a fairly general class of noncooperative…

We seek to understand the fundamental mathematics governing infrastructure-scale interactions between humans and machines, particularly when the machines' intended purpose is to influence and optimize the behavior of the humans. To that…

This paper studies the performance of Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) when the nodes, that form a Poisson point process, selfishly choose their Medium Access Probability (MAP). We consider goodput and delay as the performance metric that…

This article studies the user behavior in non-atomic congestion games. We consider non-atomic congestion games with continuous and non-decreasing functions and investigate the limit of the price of anarchy when the total user volume…

We consider a fundamental game theoretic problem concerning selfish users contributing packets to an M/M/1 queue. In this game, each user controls its own input rate so as to optimize a desired tradeoff between throughput and delay. We…

Game theory has emerged as a fruitful paradigm for the design of networked multiagent systems. A fundamental component of this approach is the design of agents' utility functions so that their self-interested maximization results in a…

In this paper, we extend the discussion of the price of anarchy of machine scheduling games to a multi-stage machine setting. The multi-stage setting arises naturally in manufacturing pipelines and distributed computing workflows, when each…

Routing games are amongst the most studied classes of games. Their two most well-known properties are that learning dynamics converge to equilibria and that all equilibria are approximately optimal. In this work, we perform a stress test…

We consider non-cooperative unsplittable congestion games where players share resources, and each player's strategy is pure and consists of a subset of the resources on which it applies a fixed weight. Such games represent unsplittable…

When network users are satisficing decision-makers, the resulting traffic pattern attains a satisficing user equilibrium, which may deviate from the (perfectly rational) user equilibrium. In a satisficing user equilibrium traffic pattern,…

Network creation games are well-established for investigating the decentralized formation of communication networks, like the Internet or social networks. In these games, selfish agents that correspond to network nodes strategically create…

In classical job-scheduling games, each job behaves as a selfish player, choosing a machine to minimize its own completion time. To reduce the equilibria inefficiency, coordination mechanisms are employed, allowing each machine to follow…

Today's networks consist of many autonomous entities that follow their own objectives, i.e., smart devices or parts of large AI systems, that are interconnected. Given the size and complexity of most communication networks, each entity…

We consider the problem of optimal charging of plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs). We treat this problem as a multi-agent game, where vehicles/agents are heterogeneous since they are subject to possibly different constraints. Under the…

Many distributed systems can be modeled as network games: a collection of selfish players that communicate in order to maximize their individual utilities. The performance of such games can be evaluated through the costs of the system…

In this work we propose a macroscopic model for studying routing on networks shared between human-driven and autonomous vehicles that captures the effects of autonomous vehicles forming platoons. We use this to study inefficiency due to…