Social Welfare and Price of Anarchy in Preemptive Priority Queues
Computer Science and Game Theory
2020-03-03 v2
Abstract
Consider an unobservable queue with preemptive-resume scheduling and two priority classes. Customers are strategic and may join the premium class for a fee. We analyze the resulting equilibrium outcomes, equilibrium stability, and social welfare. We find that for service distributions with coefficient of variation greater than 1, there exists a unique and stable mixed equilibrium at low loads. We also establish a tight bound on the price of anarchy, which is .
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2002.12914,
title = {Social Welfare and Price of Anarchy in Preemptive Priority Queues},
author = {Jonathan Chamberlain and David Starobinski},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2002.12914},
year = {2020}
}
Comments
Submitted for publication, 8 pages