The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions
Computer Science and Game Theory
2020-07-21 v1
Abstract
We study the efficiency of sequential multiunit auctions with two-buyers and complete information. For general valuation functions, we show that the price of anarchy is exactly for auctions with items for sale. For concave valuation functions, we show that the price of anarchy is bounded below by . This bound is asymptotically tight as the number of items sold tends to infinity.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2007.10131,
title = {The Price of Anarchy of Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions},
author = {Mete Şeref Ahunbay and Adrian Vetta},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2007.10131},
year = {2020}
}
Comments
20 pages, 1 figure