Related papers: Repeated Matching Games: An Empirical Framework
Problem definition: In many matching markets, some agents are fully flexible, while others only accept a subset of jobs. For example, ridesharing drivers can specify on the platform the destinations they are willing to accept. Conventional…
We consider trading indivisible and easily transferable \emph{durable goods}, which are goods that an agent can receive, use, and trade again for a different good. This is often the case with books that can be read and later exchanged for…
Wage dispersion and job-to-job mobility are central features of modern labour markets, yet canonical equilibrium search models with exogenous job-offer ladders struggle to jointly account for these facts and the magnitude of frictional wage…
This chapter explores the role of substitutability in economic models, particularly in the context of optimal transport and matching models. In equilibrium models with substitutability, market-clearing prices can often be recovered using…
We study a recently introduced class of strategic games that is motivated by and generalizes Schelling's well-known residential segregation model. These games are played on undirected graphs, with the set of agents partitioned into multiple…
In~[1],authors considered a general finite horizon model of dynamic game of asymmetric information, where N players have types evolving as independent Markovian process, where each player observes its own type perfectly and actions of all…
Schelling games model the wide-spread phenomenon of residential segregation in metropolitan areas from a game-theoretic point of view. In these games agents of different types each strategically select a node on a given graph that models…
This paper provides closed-form formulas for a multidimensional two-sided matching problem with transferable utility and heterogeneity in tastes. When the matching surplus is quadratic, the marginal distributions of the characteristics are…
In light of the growing interest in agent-based market models, we bring together several earlier works in which we considered the topic of self-consistent market modelling. Building upon the binary game structure of Challet and Zhang, we…
A replicator dynamic for non-exchangeable agents in a continuous action space is formulated and its well-posedness is proven in a space of probability measures. The non-exchangeability allows for the analysis of evolutionary games involving…
We introduce a game-theoretic approach to the study of recommendation systems with strategic content providers. Such systems should be fair and stable. Showing that traditional approaches fail to satisfy these requirements, we propose the…
We consider a large population of learning agents noncooperatively selecting strategies from a common set, influencing the dynamics of an exogenous system (ES) we seek to stabilize at a desired equilibrium. Our approach is to design a…
In many multi-agent settings, participants can form teams to achieve collective outcomes that may far surpass their individual capabilities. Measuring the relative contributions of agents and allocating them shares of the reward that…
We study a model of competition among nomadic agents for time-varying and location-specific resources, arising in crowd-sourced transportation services, online communities, and traditional location-based economic activity. This model…
Adaptivity to changing environments and constraints is key to success in modern society. We address this by proposing "incrementalized versions" of Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates. That is, we try to answer the following question: for…
Static stability in economic models means negative incentives for deviation from equilibrium strategies, which we expect to assure a return to equilibrium, i.e., dynamic stability, as long as agents respond to incentives. There have been…
This paper studies a class of models for two-sided interactions, where outcomes depend on latent characteristics of two distinct agent types. Models in this class have two core elements: the matching network, which records which agent pairs…
In this paper we propose two simple methods to estimate models of matching with transferable and separable utility introduced in Galichon and Salani\'e (2022). The first method is a minimum distance estimator that relies on the generalized…
We study stable matching problems with locality of information and control. In our model, each agent is a node in a fixed network and strives to be matched to another agent. An agent has a complete preference list over all other agents it…
We propose a heterogeneous agent market model (HAM) in continuous time. The market is populated by fundamental traders and chartists, who both use simple linear trading rules. Most of the related literature explores stability, price…