Related papers: Repeated Matching Games: An Empirical Framework
Repeated interactions are ubiquitous and known to promote social behaviour. While research often focuses on cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma, experimental evidence suggests repeated interactions also foster fairness. This study…
We introduce an extended mathematical programming framework for specifying equilibrium problems and their variational representations, such as generalized Nash equilibrium, multiple optimization problems with equilibrium constraints, and…
We prove existence and uniqueness of stochastic equilibria in a class of incomplete continuous-time financial environments where the market participants are exponential utility maximizers with heterogeneous risk-aversion coefficients and…
A well known result states that stability criterion for matchings in two-sided markets doesn't ensure uniqueness. This opens the door for a moral question with regard to the optimal stable matching from a social point of view. Here, a new…
As the widely applied method for measuring matching assortativeness in a transferable utility matching game, a matching maximum score estimation is proposed by \cite{fox2010qe}. This article reveals that combining unmatched agents,…
Game theoretic tools are utilized to analyze a one-locus continuous selection model of sex-specific meiotic drive by considering nonequivalence of the viabilities of reciprocal heterozygotes that might be noticed at an imprinted locus. The…
Strategyproof mechanisms provide robust equilibrium with minimal assumptions about knowledge and rationality but can be unachievable in combination with other desirable properties such as budget-balance, stability against deviations by…
We introduce and study an evolutionary complementarity game where in each round a player of population 1 is paired with a member of population 2. The game is symmetric, and each player tries to obtain an advantageous deal, but when one of…
Following the work of Lloyd Shapley on the Shapley value, and tangentially the work of Guillermo Owen, we offer an alternative non-probabilistic formulation of part of the work of Robert J. Weber in his 1978 paper "Probabilistic values for…
In this work we consider an agent based model in order to study the wealth distribution problem where the interchange is determined with a symmetric zero sum game. Simultaneously, the agents update their way of play trying to learn the…
In many multi-agent systems, agents interact repeatedly and are expected to settle into stable, rational behavior over time. Yet in practice, behavior often drifts, and detecting such deviations in real time remains an open challenge. We…
In a stable matching problem there are two groups of agents, with agents on one side having their individual preferences for agents on another side as a potential match. It is assumed silently that agents can freely and costlessly ``switch"…
In various economic environments, people observe other people with whom they strategically interact. We can model such information-sharing relations as an information network, and the strategic interactions as a game on the network. When…
This paper presents a simple agent-based model of an economic system, populated by agents playing different games according to their different view about social cohesion and tax payment. After a first set of simulations, correctly…
Many two-sided matching markets, from labor markets to school choice programs, use a clearinghouse based on the applicant-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, which is well known to be strategy-proof for the applicants. Nonetheless, a…
We introduce an analytical model to study the evolution towards equilibrium in spatial games, with `memory-aware' agents, i.e., agents that accumulate their payoff over time. In particular, we focus our attention on the spatial Prisoner's…
We consider a random financial network with a large number of agents. The agents connect through credit instruments borrowed from each other or through direct lending, and these create the liabilities. The settlement of the debts of various…
The classic two-sided many-to-one job matching model assumes that firms treat workers as substitutes and workers ignore colleagues when choosing where to work. Relaxing these assumptions may lead to nonexistence of stable matchings.…
We study a class of two-player repeated games with incomplete information and informational externalities. In these games, two states are chosen at the outset, and players get private information on the pair, before engaging in repeated…
Choo-Siow (2006) proposed a model for the marriage market which allows for random identically distributed noise in the preferences of each of the participants. The randomness is McFadden-type, which permits an explicit resolution of the…