Related papers: Repeated Matching Games: An Empirical Framework

We investigate a model of one-to-one matching with transferable utility and general unobserved heterogeneity. Under a separability assumption that generalizes Choo and Siow (2006), we first show that the equilibrium matching maximizes a…

We introduce the class of modified Schelling games in which there are different types of agents who occupy the nodes of a location graph; agents of the same type are friends, and agents of different types are enemies. Every agent is…

Game-theoretic solution concepts, such as the Nash equilibrium, have been key to finding stable joint actions in multi-player games. However, it has been shown that the dynamics of agents' interactions, even in simple two-player games with…

Motivated by growing evidence of agents' mistakes in strategically simple environments, we propose a solution concept -- robust equilibrium -- that requires only an asymptotically optimal behavior. We use it to study large random matching…

This paper introduces a unified framework for stable matching, which nests the traditional definition of stable matching in finite markets and the continuum definition of stable matching from Azevedo and Leshno (2016) as special cases.…

We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…

Kinetic exchange models have been successful in explaining the shape of the income/wealth distribution in the economies. However, such models usually make some ad-hoc assumptions when it comes to determining the savings factor. Here, we…

We explore a mechanism of decision-making in Mean Field Games with myopic players. At each instant, agents set a strategy which optimizes their expected future cost by assuming their environment as immutable. As the system evolves, the…

Matching plays a vital role in the rational allocation of resources in many areas, ranging from market operation to people's daily lives. In economics, the term matching theory is coined for pairing two agents in a specific market to reach…

This survey is organized around three main topics: models, econometrics, and empirical applications. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework, introduces the concept of Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium, discusses existence and…

We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…

We study a dynamic asset pricing problem in which a representative agent is ambiguous about the aggregate endowment growth rate and trades a risky stock, human capital, and a risk-free asset to maximize her preference value of consumption…

For most people, social contacts play an integral part in finding a new job. As observed by Granovetter's seminal study, the proportion of jobs obtained through social contacts is usually large compared to those obtained through postings or…

We extend the general stochastic matching model on graphs introduced in (Mairesse and Moyal, 2016), to matching models on multigraphs, that is, graphs with self-loops. The evolution of the model can be described by a discrete time Markov…

Evolutionary game theory is a framework to formalize the evolution of collectives ("populations") of competing agents that are playing a game and, after every round, update their strategies to maximize individual payoffs. There are two…

We consider a financial market model which consists of a financial asset and a large number of interacting agents classified into many types. Different types of agents are heterogeneous in their price expectations. Each agent can change its…

We consider 2-player stochastic games with perfectly observed actions, and study the limit, as the discount factor goes to one, of the equilibrium payoffs set. In the usual setup where current states are observed by the players, we show…

We consider an integro-differential model for evolutionary game theory which describes the evolution of a population adopting mixed strategies. Using a reformulation based on the first moments of the solution, we prove some analytical…

We present a general framework for matching with transferable utility (TU) that accommodates arbitrary heterogeneity without relying on the logit structure. The optimal assignment problem is characterized by tractable linear programming…

In a stable matching setting, we consider a query model that allows for an interactive learning algorithm to make precisely one type of query: proposing a matching, the response to which is either that the proposed matching is stable, or a…