Related papers: Repeated Matching Games: An Empirical Framework
Stable matching is a fundamental problem studied both in economics and computer science. The task is to find a matching between two sides of agents that have preferences over who they want to be matched with. A matching is stable if no pair…
We propose and compare new global solution algorithms for continuous time heterogeneous agent economies with aggregate shocks. First, we approximate the agent distribution so that equilibrium in the economy can be characterized by a high,…
We present an agent-based simulator for economic systems with heterogeneous households, firms, central bank, and government agents. These agents interact to define production, consumption, and monetary flow. Each agent type has distinct…
Although both data availability and the demand for accurate forecasts are increasing, collaboration between stakeholders is often constrained by data ownership and competitive interests. In contrast to recent proposals within cooperative…
A hybrid simulation-based framework involving system dynamics and agent-based simulation is proposed to address duopoly game considering multiple strategic decision variables and rich payoff, which cannot be addressed by traditional…
We generalize several schedule matching theorems of Baiou-Balinski (Math. Oper. Res., 27 (2002), 485) and Alkan-Gale (J. Econ. Th. 112 (2003), 289) by applying a fixed point method of Fleiner (Math. Oper. Res., 28 (2003), 103). Thanks to a…
We propose two solution concepts for matchings under preferences: robustness and near stability. The former strengthens while the latter relaxes the classic definition of stability by Gale and Shapley (1962). Informally speaking, robustness…
An agent-based model with interacting low frequency liquidity takers inter-mediated by high-frequency liquidity providers acting collectively as market makers can be used to provide realistic simulated price impact curves. This is possible…
This paper studies when strategic understanding acquired in one mechanism can be transferred to another. We introduce a framework in which agents' knowledge is represented as a set of payoff comparisons they can make, and use it to…
We propose a new mean-field game model with two states to study synchronization phenomena, and we provide a comprehensive characterization of stationary and dynamic equilibria along with their stability properties. The game undergoes a…
We study incentive design when multiple principals simultaneously design mechanisms for their respective teams in environments with strategic spillovers. In this environment, each principal's set of incentive-compatible mechanisms--those…
This paper is concerned with general spatially explicit versions of three stochastic models for the dynamics of money that have been introduced and studied numerically by statistical physicists: the uniform reshuffling model, the immediate…
We present a simple game model where agents with different memory lengths compete for finite resources. We show by simulation and analytically that an instability exists at a critical memory length, and as a result, different memory lengths…
Automated decision-making tools increasingly assess individuals to determine if they qualify for high-stakes opportunities. A recent line of research investigates how strategic agents may respond to such scoring tools to receive favorable…
We introduce a new class of combinatorial markets in which agents have covering constraints over resources required and are interested in delay minimization. Our market model is applicable to several settings including scheduling, cloud…
The Stable Roommates problem involves matching a set of agents into pairs based on the agents' strict ordinal preference lists. The matching must be stable, meaning that no two agents strictly prefer each other to their assigned partners. A…
This paper contains a reformulation of any $n$-player finite, static game into a framework of distributed, dynamical system based on agents' payoff-based deviations. The reformulation generalizes the method employed in the second part of…
An agent-based model of the economy is generalized to incorporate investment and guaranteed income mechanisms in addition to the exchange and distribution mechanisms considered in earlier models. We find realistic wealth distributions and…
We propose a game-theoretic dynamics of a population of replicating individuals. It consists of two parts: the standard replicator one and a migration between two different habitats. We consider symmetric two-player games with two…
Results from the communication complexity literature have demonstrated that stable matching requires communication: one cannot find or verify a stable match without having access to essentially all of the ordinal preference information held…