Related papers: Repeated Matching Games: An Empirical Framework
We study a Markov matching market involving a planner and a set of strategic agents on the two sides of the market. At each step, the agents are presented with a dynamical context, where the contexts determine the utilities. The planner…
A generalized continuous economic model is proposed for random markets. In this model, agents interact by pairs and exchange their money in a random way. A parameter controls the effectiveness of the transactions between the agents. We show…
We propose new results for the existence and uniqueness of a general nonparametric and nonseparable competitive equilibrium with substitutes. These results ensure the invertibility of a general competitive system. The existing literature…
This paper explores a novel extension of dynamic matching theory by analyzing a three-way matching problem involving agents from three distinct populations, each with two possible types. Unlike traditional static or two-way dynamic models,…
We study the problem of finding equilibrium strategies in multi-agent games with incomplete payoff information, where the payoff matrices are only known to the players up to some bounded uncertainty sets. In such games, an ex-post…
Autonomous and learning agents increasingly participate in markets - setting prices, placing bids, ordering inventory. Such agents are not just aiming to optimize in an uncertain environment; they are making decisions in a game-theoretical…
In this study, we developed a computational framework for simulating large-scale agent-based financial markets. Our platform supports trading multiple simultaneous assets and leverages distributed computing to scale the number and…
We study a multi-agent decision problem in population games, where agents select from multiple available strategies and continually revise their selections based on the payoffs associated with these strategies. Unlike conventional…
We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…
We consider an economy made of competing firms which are heterogeneous in their capital and use several inputs for producing goods. Their consumption policy is fixed rationally by maximizing a utility and their capital cannot fall below a…
Designing socially optimal policies in multi-agent environments is a fundamental challenge in both economics and artificial intelligence. This paper studies a general framework for learning Stackelberg equilibria in dynamic and uncertain…
We propose a novel framework for modeling time-varying persistence in economic time series, allowing for smoothly evolving heterogeneity in shock dynamics. We leverage localized regression techniques to flexibly identify changes in…
Evolutionary game theory is a mathematical toolkit to analyse the interactions that an individual agent has in a population and how the composition of strategies in this population evolves over time. While it can provide neat solutions to…
The standard solution concept for stochastic games is Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE); however, its computation becomes intractable as the number of players increases. Instead, we consider mean field equilibrium (MFE) that has been…
We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley [GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable…
In several two-sided markets, including labor and dating, agents typically have limited information about their preferences prior to mutual interactions. This issue can result in matching frictions, as arising in the labor market for…
The paper provides consistent mathematical framework for seminal Tiebout free-mobility model (1956). Our setting supports continuum of consumers with multidimensional preferences and finite number of strategic public good providers. We…
Game theoretic equilibria are mathematical expressions of rationality. Rational agents are used to model not only humans and their software representatives, but also organisms, populations, species and genes, interacting with each other and…
The literature on centralized matching markets often assumes that a true preference of each player is known to herself and fixed, but empirical evidence casts doubt on its plausibility. To circumvent the problem, we consider evolutionary…
The study of stable matchings usually relies on the assumption that agents' preferences over the opposite side are complete and known. In many real markets, however, preferences might be uncertain and revealed only through costly…